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ABSTRACT 
One of the most important contributions to the 
discipline of sociology was Emile Durkheim's theoretical 
discussion of the collective conscience. For Durkheim, it 
was the collective conscience—the common ways of defining 
the world, as well as the common moral bond between 
people—that provided the initial foundation for social 
solidarity. It was the glue that kept society organized and 
functioning. 
While Durkheim's discussion of the collective conscience 
is a landmark contribution to sociology, it is clear that the 
idea of collective definitions and representations predates 
Durkheim. One of the purposes of this theoretical study is 
to demonstrate how indebted Durkheim's thinking was to the 
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thinking of the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer. 
Significant parallels are shown to exist between 
Schopenhauer's notion of representation in The World as Will 
and Idea and Durkheim's pivotal concept of common moral bond 
or conscience as discussed in The Division of Labor in 
Society. 
The thesis is concluded by tracing the importance of the 
collective conscience through the rest of Durkheim's major 
works—Suicide, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, and 
The Rules of Sociological Method. In each case, the link 
between Durkheim's and Schopenhauer's thinking is 
highlighted. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Few great discoveries are made by conformists. The 
health, indeed the existence, of the individuals in a group 
is often dependent upon a nonconformist who searches into 
the divergent areas of reality to find answers to social 
problems. Yet, the individual in society is under constant 
constraint to conform. 
Morality has been defined as that which brings 
solidarity to society: 
Society is not, then, as has often been 
thought, a stranger to the moral world, 
or something which has only secondary 
repercussions on it. It is, on the 
contrary, the necessary condition of its 
existence. It is not a simple 
juxtaposition of individuals who bring an 
intrinsic morality with them, but rather 
man is a moral being solidary with a 
group and varying with this solidarity. 
Let social life disappear, and moral life 
will disappear with it, since it would no 
longer have any objective. (Durkheim 
[1893] 1947, p. 397) 
The laws, rules, and norms of society, if followed 
exactly, lead to a sameness that would soon hide 
individuality. In a given group each member agrees as to 
what it takes to be part of that group. If there is no 
consensus on what defines the group, the group ceases to 
exist. Yet there is in each of us, internally, much 
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variation in how we view reality. We each may see right 
and wrong in different ways unless we are convinced 
otherwise. The environment of the group is constantly in a 
state of flux. The need for existing rules passes; a need 
for new rules arises. The norms, values, and rules of a 
group—indeed the total morphology, the "shape" or "form" of 
the group itself—is constantly changing due to the 
variability of the individuals in the group. 
Most of us, including many sociologists, like to think 
of the collective as tending toward retaining a given form. 
An even cursory study of history shows that actually society 
is amorphous—there is no set way that humans organize their 
interactions. The norms, values, customs, and morality of a 
group change constantly, sometimes violently. The process 
of change is a reaction to the pressure of differences both 
within and outside the group. 
The tendency of any given group is toward survival. A 
biological entity seeks homeostasis, an internal, functional 
balance, in order to survive in a harsh environment. Social 
groups also seek to maintain a kind of internal homeostasis. 
The structure or shape, the morphology of a group, is the 
interface between the internal and the external—other social 
groups it comes into contact with. In order to maintain 
homeostasis, internal balance, the exterior is in a constant 
state of change. 
One of the ways social groups function efficiently is to 
appoint leaders who oversee the group and determine what 
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actions need to occur to maintain homeostasis within the 
group. As individuals, these leaders, in order to maintain 
their position of power, have persuaded the collective that 
what is good for them is good for the group. In order to 
ensure the safety and continued existence of the group, 
leaders and their associates tend to protect their own safety 
and continued position by defining for the group just what is 
"right and wrong." Thus, after a point in organizational 
growth, an elite group forms that artificially acts as the 
definer of the collective moral structure, the conscience-
collective . 
There are acts that are repressed with 
greater severity than the strength of 
their condemnation by public opinion. 
Thus combinations between officials, the 
encroachment by judicial authorities on 
the administrative powers, or by 
religious upon secular functions are the 
object of a repression which is 
disproportionate to the indignation they 
arouse in the individual consciousness 
[conscience]. 
It is undoubtedly the case that once some 
governmental authority is instituted it 
possesses enough power of itself to 
attach penal sanctions on its own 
initiative to certain rules of conduct. 
By its own action it has the ability to 
create certain crimes or to attach 
greater seriousness to the criminal 
character of others. 
Moreover, how does it come about that the 
slightest injury done to the organ of 
government is punished, whilst other 
injuries of a much more fearsome kind 
inflicted on other bodies within society 
are redressed only by recourse to civil 
law? 
The problem is easily solved when we 
perceive that wherever an authority with 
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power to govern is established its first 
and foremost function is to ensure 
respect for beliefs, traditions and 
collective practices namely, to defend 
the common consciousness [conscience-
collective ] from all its enemies, from 
within as well as without. It thus 
becomes the symbol of that consciousness. 
... a governing authority categorizes as 
crimes those acts that are harmful to it 
[the governing authority], even when the 
sentiments of the collective are not 
affected to the same extent. 
We shall see that it is in lower 
societies that this authority is greatest 
and where this seriousness weighs most 
heavily, and moreover, that it is in 
these self-same types of society that the 
collective consciousness [ conscience-
collective ] possesses most power. 
Durkheim [1893] 1984, pp. 41-43) 
Marx saw the powerful authority of government in terms 
of economics, a constant changing of hands at the helm but 
always someone at the helm, exploiting others. Marx 
predicted the fall of such societies and said such a fall was 
inevitable. The fall has not happened. In fact, those 
societies supposedly established on Marx's principles are 
apparently in danger of falling (have now [1993] fallen) 
before those types of societies he predicted to fall. Why, 
with everything leading toward a breakup, does government of 
one form or another continue? Even if applied from above, 
coercively, what phenomena hold society together? 
Emile Durkheim, in the late nineteenth century, did in 
fact ask those very questions. According to Talcott Parsons 
(Giddens 1972, p. 39), Durkheim searched for a resolving of 
the " 1...Hobbesian problem of order1: that is, how society 
avoids the 'war of all against all'." One of the principles 
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he arrived at and which increases social solidarity in the 
face of the continual possibility of disruption is a process 
that has been called, variously, "social mind" (Blakmar 1908, 
p. 245), "social consciousness" (Blakmar 1908, p. 246), 
"common consciousness" (Denisoff and Wahrman 1983, p. 63; 
Turner 1967, p. 61), "common conscience" (Durkheim [1893] 
1947, pp. 396-397), "collective consciousness" (Van Den 
Berghe 1978, pp. 244- 245), and other terms. 
From the variety of terms used in describing this 
experience it might appear that confusion has run rampant 
since Durkheim discussed this important unifying factor. 
It is a paradox, indeed, that a term used to describe a 
unifying phenomenon in society would be so variously named 
and described. 
On first reading one might accuse Durkheim of being 
para-psychological, of believing in a psychic "over-mind" 
that controls the thinking of the people in a group. Another 
might say that such a phenomenon as a universally experienced 
moral mind-set does not exist. Jung, in fact, proposed a 
collective memory. The collective memory, to Jung, was the 
distillation of traumatic experiences of our ancestors which 
helped to define our own actions and thinking in modern life. 
One introductory textbook (Denisoff and Wahrman 1983, 
p. 63) that uses the words "common consciousness" quotes 
Turner (1967) in defining the meaning of the term: 
Mechanical solidarity is based upon a 
"common consciousness" or a sense of 
likeness with one's fellows, (p. 63) 
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Berger and Berger (1972, p. 378) define "collective 
representations" (from Durkheim's The Elementary Forms of 
the Religious Life, 1961) and "collective consciousness" 
together in relationship with each other: 
The former term (collective 
representations) refers to all those 
ideas (normative or cognitive) that a 
group of people hold in common. The 
latter term (collective consciousness) 
refers to the sum total of the collective 
representations—in other words, to 
whatever coherent view of the world is 
held by a particular group, (p. 346) 
Durkheim ([1893] 1964) provides us with his own 
definitions: 
...collective conscience ... totality of 
beliefs and sentiments common to average 
citizens of the same society, (pp.79-80) 
In at least one case Durkheim describes a "social 
consciousness" (awareness?) in contrast to "individual 
awareness": 
There exists a social consciousness of 
which individual consciousnesses are, at 
least in part, only an emanation. How 
many ideas or sentiments are there which 
we obtain completely on our own? Very 
few. Each of us speaks a language which 
he has not himself created: we find it 
ready-made. (Durkheim [1885] 1978, p. 102) 
Steven Lukes, in the introduction to his historical 
and critical study of Durkheim, states: 
The French word conscience is ambiguous, 
embracing the meanings of the two English 
words 'conscience' and 'consciousness.' 
Thus the 'beliefs and sentiments' comprising 
the conscience-collective are, on the one 
hand, moral and religious, and, on the 
other, cognitive. (1973, p.4) 
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Lukes explains further by quoting Larousse as giving two 
main senses of "conscience": 
1) The feelings one has about existence, and 
the exterior world, the representations one 
has. 2) The feelings one has about the 
moral judgements of acts being 'right' or 
"wrong." (1973, p.4) (My translation) 
The use of the word "representations" here gives us a 
connection to the German philosopher Schopenhauer. Lukes, 
then, shows a link between how we interpret the material 
world around us, what society teaches us to be aware of, and 
how to define what we observe and what we come to believe is 
"right" and "wrong." 
There is, then, some variety in defining just what Emile 
Durkheim meant when he named this phenomenon. While I do not 
believe we would do justice to sociology and modern 
sociological theory by limiting the use of Durkheim's ideas 
to those concepts as he first visualized them, I do believe 
we will do better service to Durkheim and his ideas if we 
make an effort to determine just what he meant by "collective 
conscience." 
It was in Durkheim's doctoral paper, Division of Labor 
in Society, ([1893} 1933) that he discussed the forms of 
solidarity he saw in action in society to hold it together: 
1) mechanical solidarity and 2) organic solidarity. Durkheim 
described mechanical solidarity as that solidarity 
experienced in a primitive society, with strong sanctions 
applied to those who "break the rules." Organic solidarity is 
experienced in modern, industrial societies, where the 
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division of labor (responsibilities) causes each individual 
to need others for his or her existence and comfort. It 
seems he was a bit prejudiced (ethnocentric) about modern 
society being superior to and stronger than the primitive. 
It was in the study of primitive, mechanical society 
that Durkheim searched for the origin of laws. It was 
apparently laws that held this form of society together. How 
do laws originate? How are they maintained? Why is there so 
much "universal" agreement in what laws should exist? 
Durkheim proposed the experience of "collective 
conscienceness" as the answer. 
What then of the cross-cultural nature of this 
collectiveness that Durkheim observed? Durkheim was studying 
work that had been done on "primitive" societies when he 
arrived at the term conscience-collective. It must be 
remembered that all societies in existence at the present 
time, regardless of appearances, are the result of the same 
amount of developmental time. 
If our present industrial society is the result of 
thousands of years of development, then so also is the 
"primitive" society of the Australian Aborigines. The two 
types of societies are different due to different 
environments, not because one society is inherently "better" 
than another or "newer." 
Why is the rule against murder universally held in all 
societies? Is it universal awareness, some ethereal, psychic 
"mind set"? Of course, the fact is there is no universal 
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rule against killing humans, not even a universal rule 
against killing humans from one's own family or tribe. It is 
so in many, perhaps most, cultures; but there is no 
inherent sense of wrongness about murder. 
It is easy to see, however, how such things as murder or 
theft would predominate as "bad things" for humans. People 
do not want to be harmed or to lose things they cherish. In 
order not to have those things happen to us we agree with 
others not to do those things to them. More important, we 
agree to the punishments for those who do them. Finally, we 
teach our children the rules so that the cycle may continue. 
To sum up, then, the experience of "collective-
conscienceness, social consciousness," is a sense of 
"Everyone around me agrees; I agree with everyone around me," 
in matters of right and wrong. It is a learned sense, a part 
of the process of self-formation. Some facet of "me" is that 
part which "does good" and "does not do bad," and "I" demand 
total consensus. 
The collective consciousness is that that which we as 
individuals have learned from the collective is to be 
observed and even how it is to be observed. Collective 
representations are the collective concepts of reality. The 
conscience-collective is the near-consensus of what is 
acceptable or unacceptable, moral or immoral behavior. 
It is my goal in this work, to introduce the principle 
of inter-active equivalence, to show the parallel between the 
view of Schopenhauer and the view of Durkheim concerning 
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"representations," both individual and collective, and to 
discuss the "collective-conscience" and its continuing 
power in modern society. 
In this paper, I am attempting to restate two primal 
principles and to present one new, yet not so new, one. 
Emile Durkheim thought that the principle of the collective 
morality, the conscience-collective, would cease to be the 
"glue" that would stick society together. He believed that 
in a society dependent upon differentiation of skills for its 
economic welfare, that differentiation would itself become 
the solidarity factor. He did not, could not, discern that 
humans will not release themselves from primitive or 
simplistic societal relationships. He did foresee that once 
established, the coercive social institution, government, 
would create the conscience-collective to its own ends. He 
did not foresee that once this power was established, it, the 
government, would become virtually eternal and all-powerful. 
Conscience-collective is still the determinant of right and 
wrong in society. 
Schopenhauer proposed that we cannot ever come to know 
the "thing in itself" in the world around us. We can only 
"know" the pictures or representations we have in our minds, 
created by the signals our senses send to our brains. 
Durkheim would add that society is the determinant of the 
shape of our individual representations. Durkheim posited 
that society, as a sentient being in its own right, has 
representations of its own. This view of reality, often 
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different from the representations of individuals in the 
society, is dominant, coercive over the individual mind. 
Sanctions are created to force the individual to agree with 
society's view of reality. 
I am describing a principle that I see in action 
throughout society. This principle is the process of coming 
to agreement with those around you--of dressing alike, 
talking alike, of agreeing with those around you as to the 
accepted view of reality. I see this process as a constant, 
an ongoing process. I call it the principle of interactive 
equivalence. 
It is my hope that the reader may desire to delve into 
the world of pragmatic, empirical, theoretical sociology. 
There is a need to return to "first-principles." 
CHAPTER II 
DURKHEIM AND SCHOPENHAUER 
Emile Durkheim was a social-philosopher who lived during 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He was born in 
1858, in the French town of Epinal. He died in 1917 (La 
Capra 1972, p. 27). His doctoral work, The Division of Labor 
in Society, was a presentation of his views on society and 
its solidarity. He had been published in journals before, 
but Division of Labor was his first book. In Division of 
Labor, Durkheim, as did Schopenhauer in his doctoral paper, 
presented the basic ideas that were not to change during his 
lifetime. 
Durkheim did not live in a vacuum. He was familiar with 
the writings of many social philosophers who had preceded 
him. He quoted or referred to Spencer, Comte, Kant, Marx, 
Saint-Simon, and many others. He had read and liked 
Schopenhauer, a German mystic-philosopher. In fact, he was 
so accustomed to quoting Schopenhauer that he was nicknamed 
"Schopen" (Lalande 1960, p. 23). A reading of Schopenhauer's 
work will quickly determine for the reader the origin of 
Durkheim's view of "representation" and "consciousness." 
Durkheim's goal was to separate the study of society 
from other disciplines and to establish the use of 
scientific method in studying society. 
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To this end, he wrote and published The Rules of 
Sociological Method ([1895] 1982). In this work Durkheim 
defines the proper study of sociology as "social facts" 
(pp. 50-59) and describes the rules for their study 
(pp. 60-84). Durkheim warns against substituting 
representations for realities (p. 60) and against the use 
of statistics unless you are dealing with statistics of a 
complete population (pp. 155-157; 200-202). 
The strongest influence on Durkheim's thinking may have 
been Arthur Schopenhauer rather than Auguste Comte, as most 
have thought (Mestrovic 1988, p. 1). In fact, Schopenhauer 
has been thought by many to have been the strongest 
philosophic influence on sociology in general (Baillot 1927 ; 
Durant 1961; Ellenberger 1970; Goodwin 1967; Hamlyn 1980; 
Janik and Toulmin 1973; Levy 1904; Magee 1983; and Simmel 
[1907] 1986). If we are to understand Durkheim, then we 
should examine, at least superficially, the philosophy of 
Arthur Schopenhauer as it may apply to Durkheim's sociology. 
Arthur Schopenhauer was a German philosopher during the 
early nineteenth century. Schopenhauer's basic philosophic 
problems during his life were the questions, "What is 
reality, really?" and "Can we 'know' reality, really?" 
Schopenhauer's view was that there are two "realities." 
The first, an objective "reality"; the second, a subjective 
one. Concerning objective reality, he discusses the 
existence of a "real" table, upon which rests "real" paper, 
upon which I write with a "real" pen. A "real" sun beats 
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down upon my "real" head; I "see" before me, a "real" beach, 
with "real" people sunning themselves. I see, hear, and feel 
these things and perceive them to be "real." I have no 
choice, as my experience in life tells me to so perceive 
them. Do I perceive the objectively "real" object, or 
something else? 
This philosophical position was to influence Emile 
Durkheim strongly as he devised his theories to explain how a 
collective can view an event differently from how the 
individual views the same event, and how the collective will 
imposes its view upon the individual. 
Schopenhauer's Individual Reality 
We all are aware of the physical world around us. The 
sky, a tree, a house, rain, the earth. We all agree when 
one of us says, "There is a cat." Indeed, that is a cat. 
But what is a cat? Is a cat a certain kind of fur, or 
whiskers, or eyes? Is a cat a cat because it "meows" or 
purrs? If a dog "mewed," would it be a cat? If a cat were 
mute, would it not be a cat? If you were to take character-
istics, one by one, from a cat and gave them to a dog, at 
what point would the dog become a cat and the cat something 
else? In a more general sense how do we determine what a cat 
or dog is? How do we know what a "rock" is? Schopenhauer 
answered the question by focusing on the relations between 
the "real" objects around us (the world as "will"), our 
senses, the representations in our minds (the world as 
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"representation," or Vorstellung) , our memories (recall of 
representation), and concepts (representations of 
representations). 
Schopenhauer ([1818] 1977), in chapter one of The World 
as Will and Representation, reminds us that all we "know" of 
the world around us comes to us through our five senses. If 
we cannot see, hear, feel, taste or smell it, it does not 
exist to us. If there is a reality around us that is not 
known in one of those manners, there is no way we can be 
aware of it. If through some means we are made to "see" an 
object that others cannot see, they will think us mad for 
insisting it is there. Many times a dream is so vivid that 
one may awaken not sure of which "reality" is real. 
We now know that our range of sensitivity is very 
limited. Other creatures are aware of sights, sounds, tastes 
and odors that we are not aware of. Compared to the full 
spectrum of phenomena to be sensed, very little is knowable 
by us. Yet we cannot even imagine a reality that does not 
fall within our range. 
Sensations we receive from the universe around us travel 
through the nervous system. These sensations are compared to 
past experience and stored in the brain. The comparison is 
very important. How sensory input compares with past 
experience determines what we think "it" is. Since we have 
now entered into the computer age, we have a little better 
understanding of how memory is stored. That glass of water 
you are looking at is really a composite of all the glasses 
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of water you have ever seen. The expected taste, feel, and 
odor of that glass of water comes from all your previous 
experiences with water. If it is actually a glass of vodka, 
your system is in for a shock! If this is your first 
experience with vodka, the memory of it will be placed in an 
area connected somewhat with water, but not too closely! 
Along with the physical memory will be stored the memory of 
the emotions you experience. 
Once an event has occurred, it is gone. From then on 
it is memory, recollection, representation only. What is a 
cat? Recall a cat. You will "see" in your mind a generic, 
composite of all cats you have experienced. Say, "Brown 
cat," and an overlay will occur eliminating all but the brown 
cats you have experienced. As you become more explicit in 
your description of the cat you are recalling, the further 
you will get from the generic concept "cat." "Cat" is not a 
single memory, but a representation of all cats recalled at 
once. "Concepts, therefore, can quite appropriately be 
called representations of representations" (Schopenhauer 
[1818] 1917, vol. 1, pp. 40-41). 
If you remember holding or petting a cat, is that cat 
and the petting real now? You should agree that the cat you 
are holding is in your memory only, not in your hands. A 
moment's reflection will cause you to realize that there is 
no difference to you between your experience of a "real" cat 
and a vivid "memory" of an experience with a cat. They are 
both electrical impulses travelling along your nervous 
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system. The difference is one of direction. 
The world, the universe surrounding us, we call reality. 
It is exterior to the self, the "object in and of itself" 
(Schopenhauer [1818] 1977, pp. 4-19). It is this reality of 
will that imposes itself upon the mind, stimulating the world 
as representation in the mind through the senses. Neither 
the object nor the subject is directly knowable, but only 
the "representation." Subject and object are combined in 
the representation (Schopenhauer [1818] 1977, pp. vi, 3, 
5-8). Many philosophers before Schopenhauer contemplated the 
possibility of there being only the one reality, that in the 
mind—which Schopenhauer called representation. Therefore, 
by extension, the world is mind or will. The Buddhist would 
solve this question by a slap in the face or a kick in the 
pants. There is something exterior to the self, but what? 
Schopenhauer agrees. Because the world as representation is 
a result of sensory input, he said that this was an 
imposition of the object's characteristics—its will—upon 
the mind, or will of the individual. Therefore, there is an 
imposition of will, even if by an inanimate object. This is 
not Implying consciousness on the part of, say, a stone, but 
it is as if the stone had conscious will. Therefore, since 
the stone is real in its consequences, it- is real indeed. In 
this sense, all things that are represented in the mind have 
will, imposing their existence upon the individual will. 
Existing in the mind, by representation, they therefore 
exist. They exist, to us, because of the representation, not 
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before it. Yet, they exist to themselves, "in reality" in 
some form, apart from our representation: 
Thing in itself signifies that which 
exists independently of our perception, 
that which actually is. To Democritus it 
was matter; fundamentally this is what it 
still was to Locke; to Kant it was = x; 
to me it is will. (Schopenhauer [1813] 
1899, p. 55) 
Schopenhauer's "World as Will" is the objective world. 
It is the "thing in itself." This word processor before me, 
which reflects light waves to my eyes and pushes against my 
fingers as I type, is an objective reality, a "thing to 
itself," a "presentation." It exists, probably separate 
from, and even perhaps different from, the image I have in my 
mind that I label "word processor." This image in my mind, 
Plato's "ideal type," is separate from, and exists 
independently from, the objective "world as will." It is 
Schopenhauer's "World as Idea," or "representation" 
(Schopenhauer [1818] 1977, pp. 3-9). 
We all know the real world through our senses, as do 
all living things. The way, according to Schopenhauer, in 
which humans differ from all other living things is that we 
have the power of creating conceptual pictures in our minds 
created from, and "representing" (Vorstellung), the objective 
reality. It is this representation that we know, not the 
objectively real object. The thing itself, the objective 
reality, the real table, is not known to us at all. What 
we experience is the imposition of the "will" of the object, 
through our senses, upon our continually amorphous mental 
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conception. With time we come to think of this 
representation as the thing itself though it is, of course, 
not the thing itself at all. The thing in itself is not 
knowable at all "because appearance remains appearance and 
does not become thing in itself" (Schopenhauer [1851] 1970, 
p. 55). 
It follows, then, that each individual has his/her own 
reality—a personalized, unique Vorstellung of the universe. 
This "reality" is a result of experience with the exterior 
world. As we interact with the exterior world, we adapt our 
Vorstellung until we sense that our internal universe agrees 
with the signals being sent to us from the exterior universe. 
Schopenhauer begins The World as Will and Representation 
with the statement, "The world is my representation 
(Vorstellung)" (Schopenhauer [1818] 1977, p. 1). In so doing 
he follows the lead of Plato and Kant, as well as 
acknowledging a debt to the Eastern philosophies. All I 
know of reality is the image built in my mind from the 
sensations sent to my brain from the outside world. My 
knowledge of the world around me is only a representation. 
This "reality" Schopenhauer calls Vorstellung. It is mine; 
it is unique; it may or may not be an accurate representation 
of an objective "reality." As Schopenhauer put it in the 
opening lines of his The World as Will and Idea : 
'The world is my idea:'—this is a truth 
which holds good for everything that 
lives and knows, though man alone can 
bring it into reflective and abstract 
consciousness. If he really does this, 
he has attained to philosophical wisdom. 
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It then becomes clear and certain to him 
that what he knows is not a sun and an 
earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a 
hand that feels an earth; that the world 
which surrounds him is there only as 
idea, i.e., only in relation to something 
else, the consciousness, which is 
himself... No truth therefore is more 
certain, more independent of all others, 
and less in need of proof than this, that 
all that exists, (exists) for knowledge, 
and therefore this whole world, is only 
object in relation to subject, perception 
of a perceiver, in a word, idea 
(Vorstellung, representation). 
(Schopenhauer [1818] 1917, p. 3) 
Just as we know of the earth only the 
surface, not the great, solid masses of 
the interior, so we know empirically of 
things and the world nothing at all 
except their appearances, i.e. the 
surface. (Schopenhauer [1818] 1917, 
p. 55) 
While Schopenhauer dealt very little with morality, in 
and of itself, we can easily apply Schopenhauer's 
methodology to this subject. Conscience is a sense of right 
and wrong. A person feels that doing a certain thing is 
either good to do or is evil. This feeling is again 
representation. Representations are pictures in our minds 
that are a result of the summation of our experiences. 
Therefore, it can be said that a person's conscience is a 
summative result of all the "good" and "evil" experiences he 
or she has had. Individual experiences result in individual 
consciences—but, experiences with what, or whom? For that 
answer, we must turn to Durkheim. 
Chapter III 
DURKHEIM'S COLLECTIVE REALITY: 
THE COLLECTIVE AS AN ENTITY 
Durkheim's most important point in creating sociology as 
a science was that social facts have an existence of their 
own, "sui generis." It was his contention that while social 
facts were created by the interaction of individuals in 
society, those facts, as rituals, began to exist 
independently of the individual, even became coercive over 
the individual. A question we might ask is, "How do we come 
to create rituals of interaction that dominate us once they 
are created? Is the rule, 'majority always rules' a 
universal rule?" 
Where there is only one, no society exists. There is 
only a singularity. Language is not necessary, for there is 
no one with whom to communicate. Sensations are undefined in 
the sense that no name is applied to them. No rituals of 
conduct are necessary because there is no one to be offended. 
One does not need to be careful of what is picked up because 
all belongs to the one. The concept of "mine" cannot develop 
because "mine" only has meaning in contrast to "yours." In 
fact, the concept that we think of as "me" is so wrapped up 
in the concept "other" that once a person has learned to 
think of "self" in contrast to "other self," it is nearly 
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impossible to think of "self" in any other terms. 
There are documented cases of "feral children," children 
who have grown to young adulthood without the normal 
interaction with peers. These people were often called 
"wolf-children" in times past. They do not have what 
socialized humans would call a language. They know nothing 
of how to communicate in human society, but they do learn 
quickly. 
Before we learned to speak, as children, we must have 
had thoughts. Pure thinking, without the dilution of 
socially constructed representations, is a goal of many who 
seek "nirvana." It is supposed that before the overlay of 
language, the thoughts of the fetal mind are "pure" in kind. 
Once language is learned, whatever thought was to us is lost, 
probably forever. 
Adam was not alone. There was always God as other to be 
used as comparison. Once there was a recognized other that 
was similar to, but not exactly the same as self (Eve), very 
important and devastating events began to occur. The monad 
exists without shame. There is no wrong, for there is no one 
to be wronged. Property rights are not in question. There 
was no shame. Shame needs an "other" before which to be 
shamed. 
The dyad introduces all of these. There is no knowledge 
of good or evil until other appears, for there is no good or 
evil to be performed until there is an other upon whom good 
or evil can be performed. The serpent of Genesis is the "sui 
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generis" social entity that comes into existence when society 
is formed. The fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and 
evil is the result of awareness (knowledge) of the 
possibility of good and evil being performed, for now there 
is other to whom to do good or evil. 
Now that there is other, there is a need to communicate, 
a naming of "mine" and "your's." Territory is 
created—language, emotion, pain, joy, desire. Loneliness is 
a creation of the dyad. When one has been alone only, there 
is no idea of any other condition. It is, no doubt, a good 
thing not to be alone, but there is a price to be paid for 
company. The introducing of a third has complications of its 
own. 
When a third person is introduced to the dyad, all kinds 
of things are now capable of happening. When there were two, 
attention and/or affection were easily monopolized. With the 
third, there is now real competition for material objects and 
space, as well as emotional support. With three, there is 
always the possibility of one using manipulation of the other 
two to attain control. If government is defined as control 
of others, it first rears its ugly head in the triad. 
Development of Collective Phenomena 
A person is born into a society with no more than 
instincts and capabilities. There is no previous knowledge 
of right or wrong. How to act in specific situations, the 
meanings of words, and the nature of a God are learned in the 
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process of being socialized, which has traditionally been 
called "growing up." Maturity, rather than being significant 
of some period of time of existence, is actually acquired 
when the individual has reached the point of being capable of 
acting or reacting properly in the majority of situations a 
given society might present. Place a mature person from one 
society into a society drastically different from the one 
he/she is accustomed to, and the person becomes immature 
again, a stranger in a strange land. 
The first influence most humans receive in the process 
of defining right and wrong is most often the mother. Mother 
is the source of warmth, food, comfort, and sounds. Such 
nuturing occurs very much by biological necessity. Other 
situations are becoming more common, but experience is 
teaching us that being raised without a mother figure causes 
incomplete or defective socialization, often resulting in 
inability to communicate emotionally with others. 
It is from "mother" we first learn correct and incorrect 
behavior. The necessity to urinate or defecate in proper 
places and times, the meanings of facial expressions are all 
first discovered in the bosom of mother. The first expansion 
from a totally self-centered monad to a loving dyad, the 
first reaching out to "other" to give as well as to receive 
warmth, comfort, and affection are experienced while yet 
firmly attached to the breast of mother. 
Very early in the process of socialization, the child 
begins to experience the beginnings of the triad of mother, 
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father, and child. The child becomes aware of new entities, 
unfamiliar faces, and sounds. The child finds that there are 
other places to go for comfort, feelings, and interactions. 
Very soon ways are learned to hold captive the attentions of 
more than one person. 
As the child's capability to self-motivate and to touch 
and experience the world around him/her increases, the child 
also experiences the fact that some things are good to do and 
other things are bad to do. This learning usually comes 
through the actions of punishment and reward. When something 
unacceptable is done, pain or removal of a comfort source 
results. When acceptable actions are performed, comfort is 
given, or, at the least, no action results. Through this 
process the basic concepts of "right" and "wrong" are taught. 
At first the action is related to the punishment, but very 
quickly the activity itself is seen as being wrong in and of 
itself. The punishment for wrong acts is no longer external 
but internalized. It becomes obvious or apparent that 
certain acts are, of themselves, right or wrong. The social 
rules, through the use of sanctions from the first social 
institution, the family, become realities, actualities in and 
of themselves, reified. The first social fact, first 
experienced by the individual through the actions of the 
first social institution, is the conscience-collective. 
Through the sanctions imposed on the individual by the family 
to enforce the accepted moral structure, the individual 
conscience is created. 
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From this point on, as the person grows to "maturity," 
growing social institutions are encountered. As the person 
comes to be acquainted with church, school, peer-groups, 
neighborhood, government, the media, employment, clubs, and 
lodges, modifications and adjustments are made in the moral 
structure, in the conscience. Few societies are totally 
consistent in structure. Each social institution has its own 
special situational morality. Yet, societies are not totally 
amorphous. The shape of a society, or any part of a society, 
is the shape of its moral structure. By definition, a 
society is formed by its social facts. As Durkheim observed, 
social facts are 
...any way of acting, whether fixed or 
not, capable of exerting over the 
individual an external constraint; which 
is general over the whole of a given 
society whilst having an existence of its 
own, independent of its individual 
manifestations. (Durkheim, [1895] 1966, 
p. 13) (emphasis added) 
The individual comes to know that what is correct action 
in a private lodge—walking around naked, saying strange 
things, or hugging other members—is not proper action in a 
public place. There is no stable morality, but what is right 
to do here and now is not right to do then and there. Yet, 
there is a consistency. The conscience-collective of a given 
society has/is a core of generalized, basic rules. In 
American society, for instance, it is right to follow orders, 
be punctual, conform to company rules, be honest, believe in 
a god, etc. This core, commonly agreed to, strictly enforced 
by society, composes the conscience-collective: 
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The totality of beliefs and sentiments 
common to the average members of a 
society forms a determinate system with a 
life of its own. It can be termed the 
collective or common conscience. 
(Durkheim, [1893] 1933, p. 79) 
Each social institution strengthens some aspects of the 
individual conscience and weakens others. The conscience-
collective , being a resultant vector, a generalization of 
intent or direction rather than a canon of rules, means that 
each individual contributes to its aspects. Interaction, 
trying out actions with those that are met, and observing the 
resultant reaction, performed by all those in a society, 
eventually brings on some kind of consensus of proper and 
improper conduct. This consensus is, then, the conscience-
collective . 
When humans first appeared on this earth, they were 
adapted to the conditions then extant. Simple observation of 
human anatomy shows that conditions on this planet were, by 
evolution of the species, comfortable and quite different 
from the conditions now existing. Under ideal conditions 
there is little to no necessity for grouping. With plentiful 
food and comfortable weather conditions, individual family 
groups could exist without community. Conditions did not 
continue as they were when humans first appeared. Food 
plants were not so plentiful. It became necessary to add 
meat to the diet. The seasonal changes brought about a need 
for clothing. Feast and famine cycles brought about an 
advantage to group food-gathering and hunting. A 
proliferation of carnivores made it advantageous to group for 
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defense. 
Along with the new social conditions came a need for new 
rules of conduct. Anything that tended to solidify the group 
was a survival trait; tendencies that would weaken the group 
were destructive. Those humans that had a tendency to group 
tended to survive. Those that tended to "go it alone" had a 
rougher time of it. It was not long before those that did 
not "go along to get along" were rejected from the group. 
This need for group solidarity is still true of our modern 
society. 
Durkheim's Collective Will 
Durkheim spoke of social facts, the proper study of 
sociology, as being universal throughout a given society, 
external to the individual, exerting motivation power over 
the individual, being moral in character, and being sui 
generis, having a life of its own separate from the 
individual. 
Is not this a case of Durkheim seeing a parallel in the 
social world to Schopenhauer's material "world as will"? Is 
there a similarity in Durkheim's way of thinking between the 
manner in which the material world imposes its form on the 
awareness of the individual and the manner in which society 
imposes its form? The two would seem to be parallel. All we 
know and can know of the material world is through the 
representations in our minds, created by the external world 
of will through our senses. All we know of the social world 
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is through representations in our minds, 
created by the external social world through the conscience-
collective : 
Durkheim's collective conscience is the 
social will acting upon humans even when 
they are asleep or otherwise unaware of 
it. It is the spontaneous action of the 
division of labor which human agency did 
not and could not create. (Mestrovic 
1988, p. 4) 
Durkheim, in his description of the conscience-
collective , builds a picture of nearly absolute constraint. 
The society imposes its "will" upon the individual. Like 
God, society is to the individual eternal in that it existed 
before the individual, will continue through the lifetime of 
the individual, and will continue after the individual is 
gone. Society, through the imposition of moral sanctions, 
becomes all-powerful in the enforcement of the conscience-
collective . Society is external to the individual, yet the 
moral aspects of social life are indelibly imprinted on the 
mind of the individual. Society is, therefore, like Calvin's 
God—eternal, omniscient, all-powerful, demanding of absolute 
obedience, and internally experienced. "In Durkheim's 
sociology, society became the representation of Calvin's God" 
(Mestrovic 1988, p. 2). 
Even sociological phenomena, such as division of labor, 
are seen to have "lives" and "wills" of their own that are 
independent of the individual wills that would seem to make 
them up: 
Durkheim, like Schopenhauer, believed 
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that the division of labor is fueled by a 
"will" of its own that develops 
independent of human reason, because it 
must." (Mestrovic 1988, p. 12) 
This collective will, this imposition of form upon the 
conscience of the individual, like God, is never resting, 
invisible, insidious, and all-powerful over even the 
unconscious of the individual. Durkheim's social world as 
will, then, directly parallels Schopenhauer's objective world 
as will. 
Durkheim's Collective Representation/Vorstellung 
Durkheim did, then, view society as constraining, as 
exercising a will of its own over the individual. Now, the 
question is, did Durkheim also view society in terms of 
Schopenhauer's "idea" or Vorstellung? We turn again to 
Mestrovic: 
Durkheim built his sociology upon the 
notion of representation, ideas, and 
symbols, insisting that society is a 
system of representations. But 
Schopenhauer had earlier made that claim 
in The World as Will and Idea, which 
Durkheim ([1887] 1976) apparently 
admired. The philosophical starting 
point for Schopenhauer is that no inquiry 
should start with the object of the 
subject—as most inquiries do, especially 
in contemporary sociology-~but with the 
representation, which encompasses both. 
The world can never be known as a 
thing-in-itself; reality can never speak 
for itself.For him (Durkheim), society is 
a representation, not the outcome of 
human agency nor material determinants. 
It is neither entirely objective nor 
subjective. (Mestrovic 1988, p. 2) 
Durkheim saw that without the use of symbols to express 
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representations, society itself would not be possible. Human 
society may be unique in that it is built upon 
representations, and not upon immediate physical necessity: 
Social life, in all its aspects and in 
every period of its history, is made 
possible only by a vast symbolism 
including all kinds of "representations." 
(Durkheim [1912] 1965, p. 264). 
By extension, then, Durkheim presages George H. Mead in 
viewing language <=> symbols <=> representations as being the 
very structure of society (Mauss [1950] 1979, p. 11). 
The very structure of language is symbols. If society is 
made possible only by the use of symbols, then perhaps 
without language society would not exist. If it can be shown 
that the concept of self is made possible only through the 
interactions within society, the question arises, very 
Durkheimianly, does the "self" exist without symbols? 
Durkheim argued that religion was of paramount 
importance in shaping people's representations (Durkheim 
[1950] 1957). Religion, the keeper of the conscience-
col lective, shapes reality in the same manner as Schopenhauer 
had proposed that the senses and the mind shape and distort 
reality. Later social philosophers have proposed that 
society, through collective representations, consciousness 
and conscience, control how the individual shapes personal 
representations, not only of social facts but physical ones 
as well. 
We have looked at the main principles of Schopenhauer 
and Durkheim separately. Next we must see if there are any 
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parallels in their thinking and how they might apply to the 
collective mind and will. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE INFLUENCE OF SHOPENHAUER'S IDEAS 
ON DURKHEIM'S THINKING 
Schopenhauer was concerned with defining the reality of 
a physical, objective universe. Durkheim was concerned with 
defining a subjective, but none the less real, social 
universe. Schopenhauer viewed the external world to be 
interpreted by the mind. The senses pick up signals from 
objects. These signals are then translated into digital 
electrical signals which impress or impose themselves upon 
the brain, which then interprets these signals into some kind 
of sense, a representation of the external reality. 
Durkheim looks at a similar situation in defining the 
social world. For whatever reason, social restrictions upon 
individual actions are created. From that point on these 
restrictions have a life and a reality of their own. Imposed 
upon the individual from birth through the actions of social 
facts and institutions, they become, for the individual, 
social "reality," "the way things are." The individual, if 
well socialized, is incapable of seeing any "reality" other 
than that within which he or she was raised. 
It must be emphasized that the way we interpret the 
sensory signals we receive from the "world as will," the 
objective universe and how we define what is, in fact, 
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"reality," is socially defined and taught to us from birth. 
It can be said, then, that "reality" is not separate from 
society but rather is always defined by the collective. We 
have created not only a god in our own image but also a 
universe after our likeness. 
These two philosophers, one studying individual 
representations of the physical world and the other societal 
representations, viewed their universes in nearly, if not 
exactly, the same manner. Can it be said that Durkheim 
derived his ideas after reading Schopenhauer? Or is it that 
truly great minds follow similar paths? The important point 
here is that both social and individual views of reality are 
but interpretations, representations, and not the "things in 
themselves." They are individual representations created by 
social consciousness. 
How can we see an influence of Schopenhauer's ideas on 
Durkheim? First of all, Durkheim was certainly familiar with 
and admired the work of Schopenhauer. Lalande (1960, p. 22) 
states that Schopenhauer was Durkheim's "favorite 
philosopher." There is also a parallel in their thinking. 
In Durkheim's definition of the proper study for 
sociologists, he defines the term "social facts" as 1) being 
universal throughout the society, 2) existing external to 
the individual, 3) being coercive (having impositive power 
over the individual), 4) having moral implications, and 
5) having a history or continuing existence (Durkheim [1895] 
1982, pp. 50-59). 
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With the possible exception of the moral sanctions, 
Durkheim's definition of social facts parallels 
Schopenhauer's definition of world as will. Society defines 
a correct interpretation of reality by labelling what is 
socially correct as good and that which is not socially 
correct as bad. It makes the definition of reality not only 
a collective action but a moral one as well. 
Social facts, like the world as will, impose upon the 
individual a way of thinking, a forcing of a particular view 
of reality upon the individual will. The collective will, 
through the action of social facts or social institutions, 
forces a representation of reality upon the individual mind, 
just as Schopenhauer's world as will forces upon the 
individual will a representation of the material world. 
There is both an individual representation of the 
subjective world and a social, collective representation of 
the world. Durkheim called this collective representation 
the conscience-collective. The French word conscience is 
used here not just in a moral sense but in the broadest 
sense of total awareness, total consciousness, or 
"representation." 
The individual will often accept the interpretation of 
reality made by the collective, even when the senses say 
otherwise. Thus, Durkheim completes Schopenhauer by defining 
whence comes the representation, not just a reaction to the 
signals sent to the brain by the senses but also a 
definition of reality provided by society. Durkheim's debt 
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to the thinking of Schopenhauer is shown by Durkheim's 
building of his theory of society on the notion that society 
is made up of representations, ideas, and symbols. 
Schopenhauer first made this statement and Durkheim 
apparently accepted the argument. Schopenhauer ([1818] 1977, 
p. 3) makes the statement that we can only "know" the world 
in terms of ideas and perceptions. This statement precedes 
Durkheim's idea of society as "representation" and, no doubt, 
was the source of Durkheim's view of society in general. 
Durkheim carried Schopenhauer's thinking a step further, 
however, by refocusing representations from being only an 
individual experience into being a social experience as well. 
While it may be that Durkheim owed much to Schopenhauer 
for defining how the individual interprets the external 
world, there were others just as deeply indebted to 
Schopenhauer. Freud ([1933] 1965, p. 107), for example, 
owed a debt to Schopenhauer, as stated in an aside at one of 
his lectures: 
You may perhaps shrug your shoulders and 
say: "that isn't natural science, it's 
Schopenhauer's philosophy!" Gentlemen, 
why should not a bold thinker have 
guessed something that is afterwards 
confirmed by sober and painstaking 
detailed research? 
In Schopenhauer and Nietzsche Simmel ([1851] 1970) shows 
sociology's debt to Schopenhauer in describing the "will." 
"Schopenhauer's will became Georg Simmel's 'life'" (Mestrovic 
1988, p. 3). According to Mestrovic, (1988, p. 3), the 
concept of the "will" was as follows: 
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...almost an obsession with philosophers 
and serious thinkers from Nietzsche and 
his "will to power," to William James and 
his "will to believe." Durkheim posited 
two "wills," one, the social will, the 
conscience-collective, and the other, the 
individual will, which in Suicide (1897), 
would lead to anomie, and even suicide if 
not held in check by the collective will 
of society. 
Schopenhauer refused to accept either 
pole of philosophical thought, that is, 
subject or object. He believed that 
inquiry should begin with neither human 
perception nor "objective" reality. 
Durkheim also rejected both idealism and 
realism and tried for a a middle ground. 
This was made clear in "Individual and 
Collective Representations" (1898), and 
"The Dualism of Human Nature and Its 
Social Conditions" (1914). But not just 
here, Durkheim's work en toto reflects 
this dialectic way of thinking. 
"Durkheim denies that society is merely 
the outcome of human agency as well as 
that humans are strictly determined by 
society. (Mestrovic 1988, p. 3) 
Schopenhauer posed these problems and created a context 
for answers in The World as Will and Idea ([1818] 1977). 
Durkheim accepted the context, and throughout his works 
developed a picture of the dialectic between the individual 
and his/her social environment. 
It may be the single most important concept in both the 
philosophic and sociological world, that all is simultaneous 
presentation and representation. Schopenhauer's Vorstellung, 
Plato's "idea," and Durkheim's "collective-representation" 
are one and the same concept. The individual consciousness 
is guided by that of the collective. Reality is a social 
construction. Language, itself a social construct, not only 
labels reality but limits the individual consciousness as to 
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what it can "see." The conscience-collective, by forming the 
individual conscience, determines not only what the 
collective considers to be "real" but also decides for the 
well socialized individual what is "right" or "wrong" about 
his/her view of "reality." 
The French word "representation" literally means idea, 
but is the French word for the German word Vorstellung, 
which is the word used by Schopenhauer in the work The World 
as Will and Idea (Vorstellung). In The Rules of Sociological 
Method, Durkheim states: 
[I] had expressly stated and reiterated 
in every way possible that social life 
was made up entirely of representations. 
(Durkheim [1895] 1982, p. 34) 
....essentially social life is made up of 
representation. (Durkheim [1897] 1951, 
p. 312) 
[Society]...is a complex of ideas and 
sentiments, of ways of seeing and of 
feeling, a certain intellectual and moral 
framework distinctive of the entire 
group. (Durkheim [1925] 1961, p. 277) 
Without doubt, collective life is only 
made of representations. (Durkheim 
[1900] 1973, p. 16) 
To have repeated the point so often in so many of his works 
Durkheim must have felt the concept to be essential to the 
understanding of sociology. Pre-stating modern social-
psychologists, Durkheim considered the collective 
representation to reach even into the creation of the 
individual ego-self. The collective even defines not only 
proper conduct but the individual personality as well. He 
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also may have been the first to predict a possible conflict 
between the "self" as collective representation and the 
"self" as individual representation. 
Durkheim regarded individualism as a 
collective representation, a force that 
would impress itself on human minds 
regardless of their subjective opinions, 
as well as the manifestation of the 
egotistical will. In other words, 
Durkheim distinguished between two 
radically different forms of 
individualism that correspond roughly to 
the two poles of homo duplex, a 
collective representation of 
individualism that battles the 
narcissistic will. These two 
antagonistic forms of individualism also 
correspond roughly to Schopenhauer's 
opposition between individualism as an 
"idea" versus "will." (Mestrovic 1988, 
P. 8) 
Durkheim developed a sociology not at all unlike 
Schopenhauer's philosophy of the material world and its 
definition. It was a sociology that viewed the collective as 
a "thing to itself" that imposed a form upon the individual 
conception. At the same time, the collective itself views a 
representation of itself. This act of introspection on the 
part of society Durkheim called conscience-collective. 
Collective Representations and Conscience Compared 
Schopenhauer stated the premise that all we, as humans, 
know of the world is known as representation, Vorstellung. 
The world as will imposes its form upon our senses. The 
mind, receiving this form, then enters into memory a 
conception of this f o r m — a subjective representation— 
Vorstellung, world-as-idea of the objective world-as-will 
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(Schopenhauer [1818]) 1917). 
Durkheim proposes a social or collective equivalent 
of this phenomenon. There is, he suggests, a socially-
acceptable view of the world around us, whether it be the 
physical world or the social world. This collective 
representation is taught to us from birth, reinforced as we 
grow, and supported and legitimized by social institutions as 
well as our fellow human contacts. We believe it because it 
becomes "obvious" to us, but obvious because we have been 
taught the "rules" of how and what to observe and how to 
interpret. We are taught to ignore what disagrees with this 
collective representation. "Everybody knows" is the most 
powerful social concept (Durkheim [1893] 1933, p. 37; [1895] 
1982, p. 34; [1897] 1951, p. 312; [1900] 1973, p. 16; [1912] 
1965, p. 264; [1925] 1961, p. 277; Mestrovic 1988, pp. 2-8). 
The collective enforces its "world as idea" by 
tagging those ideas that are acceptable as right or, 
more exactly, good and those ideas that are not 
acceptable to the collective as bad or evil. This 
particular collective representation, this collective 
morality, that includes, but is not exclusive to good 
or bad actions on the part of individuals, is the 
conscience-collective (Durkheim [1893] 1984, pp. 33-40). 
What a powerful tool for a Machiavellian power 
monger! In order to justify his/her own actions in the 
pursuit of power, one need only to manipulate the 
public or, more precisely, collective opinion or 
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representation of good and bad or right and wrong 
(Durkheim [1893] 1984, pp. 41-44). The present "war on 
drugs" is a good example. 
The British colony in Virginia during the 
seventeenth century was saved from extinction by the 
exporting of a powerful mood-altering drug, nicotine, in 
tobacco. The settlers in the towns east of the 
Mississippi were supported almost entirely by the 
manufacturing and exporting of another mind-altering drug, 
alcohol. The colonies of South America were supported 
by the export of caffeine, a mood altering drug. 
Wars for the control of the trafficking of drugs 
have been fought throughout the history of mankind. In 
the past the so-called "opium wars" in Indo-China, which 
began with the English, passed on to the French, and most 
recently carried on by the American government, were not 
fought for the elimination of opium distribution. They were 
fought over who would control and receive the profits from 
that distribution. 
Drugs are used by birds, cats, and even elephants. 
Archaeologists have discovered drug usage by humans back 
as far as human remains can be found. The use of drugs for 
comfort from the stresses of existence is universal among 
societies. The use of opium and its derivatives for the 
relief from distress of injury or illness has saved countless 
millions from hours of agony. Without drugs humans might, it 
is arguable, not have societies at all. 
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Yet, through careful manipulation of the collective 
representation of what drug usage is, a collective 
conscience has been formed that not only tolerates but 
encourages what Milton Freidman has repeatedly, in 
numerous interviews and speeches, called a war against 
the people of the United States. Numerous atrocities 
are committed against the people in the name of the drug 
war. Houses are broken into, lives are destroyed, homes 
are invaded, property is stolen, children are taken from 
their homes, people are incarcerated or killed; and all 
is acceptable because of a carefully manipulated 
collective conscience. 
Because of information disseminated to the people of the 
United States and manipulation of social institutions, the 
collective representation of illegal drugs is that they are 
costly and harmful, not only to individuals but to society as 
a whole. The empirical truth is that the legal drugs--
caffein, nicotine, alcohol--are more addictive, more 
psychoactive, and more deadly than all illegal drugs taken 
together! The collective representation of illegal drugs, 
then, influences the collective conscience, which says that 
certain drugs are bad, evil. Other drugs, more dangerous, 
are acceptable to the conscience-collective and, therefore, 
good. According to Durkheim the collective conscience would 
bring about the passing of laws against certain drug usage 
and distribution. What is abhorrent to the collective is 
sanctioned by laws to enforce the collective conscience. 
However, drug usage is endemic to our society. We 
take pills to wake up in the morning, pills to sleep at 
night, pills to lose or gain weight, pills to stop the 
pain, and pills to make us more aware. The first 
cigarette and cup of coffee in the morning are almost as 
legendary as a beer or cocktail after work with the 
boys or girls. It would not be possible to manipulate the 
collective conscience against all drugs (it was tried 
against alcohol in the 1920s with disastrous results, near 
as bad as the results of the present situation); therefore 
restrictions are made against only drugs that are not so 
popular or necessary to our economy. 
Thus, the present situation serves as a graphic 
example of Schopenhauer's and Durkheim's ideas at work. 
Conscience-collective is the name of the phenomenon of a 
consensus of people in a society agreeing as to what 
is acceptable or unacceptable conduct in that society. 
In some societies infanticide is an acceptable means of 
population control. In America, today, infanticide is 
acceptable only if the child has not yet been born. 
Women in America shudder in horror at the idea of 
leaving unwanted children in the woods to die but 
actively demonstrate for their right to kill their own 
children while still in the womb. 
In both cases the subjective facts are the same. 
In both instances it is a matter of the child being 
undesirable, often but not always, due to economic 
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hardship. In both cases the subjective truth is the 
same—a child, the result of sexual intercourse, held 
within and nourished by the woman's body. The 
difference is in the representation. To the woman who 
lives in the society that practices post-partum 
infanticide, the child is a human being that will surely 
starve if allowed to live. It will bring additional 
sorrow to all involved if allowed to live. The woman 
whose society practices pre-partum infanticide is 
convinced that the life within her is not a living being, 
de facto, but only a living being en potentia and 
therefore subject to her will. The subject and object 
in this case is the same; the representation is 
different. 
In the first case the representation is a general 
one, common to the great majority of people in the 
society. Having a common representation, a common sentiment 
is experienced. The outcome is a conscience-collective from 
which societal rules result. In the second case the 
representation is not universal. There are differing 
representations in the same society, resulting in differing 
views of what should or should not be acceptable conduct in 
the society, thus creating disagreement as to what laws 
should be enacted and enforced. 
Anomie is a condition of confusion that results 
when a person is not clear as to what the collective 
representation and resulting conscience-collective is and 
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when a person is not clear what is expected of him by 
the collective. Anomie should result in social or 
even anti-social activities on the part of individuals, 
even, in extreme cases, leading to suicide. These products 
of anomie are exactly what we find in American society today. 
There is extreme unrest in American society today— 
demonstrations, near riots, violence and arrests over value 
differences on abortion and related issues. There is an 
increase in stress-related disease among American women 
today. These are good examples of collective representations 
and conscience-collective in action in the modern world. 
Conscience-collective is not identical to but a result of a 
collective representation. 
Durkheim had drawn much from Schopenhauer. 
Schopenhauer proposed that reality is not directly known 
by the observer. All that is known is the mind's image 
of reality drawn from the signals given to it by the senses. 
What we think of the universe around us as being is, in 
actuality, a collection of images, pictures drawn in our 
minds. If the physical world around us is nothing but a 
series of images, how much easier it is to think of a created 
social being, created by us, yet once created, independent of 
us and coercive over us--Dr. Frankenstein's monster. Perhaps 
Mary Shelley had read both Schopenhauer and Durkheim, or they 
her . 
There is, therefore, a clear connection between 
Schopenhauer's and Durkheim's thinking—Schopenhauer 
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seeing representations as individual events, Durkheim 
observing that all individual phenomena are shaped, 
molded, and judged by the collective. 
Chapter V 
THE COLLECTIVE-CONSCIENCE AND 
THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 
Emile Durkheim's doctoral thesis was to become one of 
the most important papers written in sociology. It was 
pivotal in that, for the first time, the basic operations of 
society and the constraints placed upon the behavior of the 
individual in both "primitive" and modern societies were 
examined. A model was proposed in which there were two 
methods whereby society is held together, two processes of 
solidarity. 
Early Societies 
Durkheim studied the societies of the aboriginal tribes 
of Australia and the Amerindians of America. From his 
examination he determined that in such societies, called by 
him "inorganic," solidarity was provided by laws, rules of 
conduct that were strictly enforced. To his own question, 
"Whence cometh these laws?" he answered: "From the phenomenon 
of the majority being in agreement as to what is 'right' and 
what is 'wrong'" (Durkheim [1893] 1984, p. 39). This common-
ality of belief, collective agreement, he termed conscience-
collective . In describing the action of this phenomenon, he 
he stressed that first comes the collective conscience-ness, 
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then afterward, the formal laws, "...an act is not offensive 
to the majority because it is criminal, it is criminal 
because it offends that consciousness" (Durkheim [1893], 
1984, p. 40). 
Perhaps the word "inorganic" is unfortunate as it may 
lead the reader to surmise that the "inorganic" or 
"mechanical" form of social solidarity is somehow mechanistic 
or robotic rather than being natural or living. In fact, 
Durkehim's use of the word here is as not having organs--
simple, nondifferentiated as opposed to complex, having 
specialization. There is nothing mechanical about either 
simple societies or simple forms of life. It is probably 
distracting to use the word "primitive" when speaking of 
either. 
The primitive life-form amoeba, while primitive in the 
sense of being simple, exists even today, 1993, and is the 
resultant of perhaps millions of years of adaptation on the 
part of its ancestors to a constantly changing environment. 
The world of today is not the same as the world of the day of 
the first amoeba. The amoeba of today may be like the first 
amoeba in only very superficial ways. 
By the same token "primitive" societies of the twentieth 
century, while seemingly simple in social structure, are also 
the end result of thousands of years of adaptation to their 
environment. They exist, like the amoeba, in the form they 
have because it works. In biologic life a characteristic 
continues just so long as it does not kill its holder before 
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it reproduces. In society, a characteristic (institution, 
ethos, culture) continues as long as it does not bring about 
the downfall of the collective before it brings on a new 
generation. 
The amoeba seems to be simple in structure, but modern 
research has shown us that, in fact, its structure is quite 
complex and is a paradigm of system and order. The exterior 
of the amoeba is highly developed to do what it does, 
basically let food in and waste out, while holding the amoeba 
in and barring admittance to possible invaders. The building 
of proteins for growth and repair is a process that would 
impress Weber for its structure, order, and specialization of 
"workers," very much like a "modern" manufacturing 
corporation. The description of an amoeba as being "simple" 
is really a description of it's social life! 
The process of reproduction, while seeming at first to 
be a simple idea--each amoeba simply divides into two, the 
two into four, and so o n — i s a very complicated process that 
ensures that after division each daughter cell carries 
exactly, identically, the same genetic structure. The 
survival idea is that what has managed to survive in the 
past is most likely to survive in the future. Each amoeba 
is a "clone" of the others in an amoeba society. They eat 
the same things, secrete the same things, and tend to travel 
together until the group gets too big for the available food. 
Amoebae protect the collective from annihilation in a 
very interesting manner. If an amoeba eater comes to dinner, 
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it tends to eat the first amoeba it comes to and so on until 
it is full or gets tired. The amoebae in the center of the 
group live on to reproduce. The survival strategy of the 
amoeba collective is to sacrifice the outer unlucky amoebae 
so that the inner amoebae may live to reproduce more quickly 
than the enemy can eat them. 
Durkheim, in The Division of Labor in Society [1893] 
1933, described early nondifferentiated societies in a 
manner that could be called a "collective of equals." Each 
individual in these nondifferentiated societies is basically 
a social clone of the others. For the most part each person 
is capable of surviving, providing his/her own food, clothes, 
shelter, etc., without the help of the others. There is 
little to no social skills differentiation in a jungle tribe. 
Like the amoeba, each individual tends to agree with the 
others in choices of food, clothing, shelter, and conduct. 
The means of survival for the human collective in a 
nondifferentiated society is the same as for the amoeba. 
Individuals may die as a result of the struggle against the 
environment; but since all are alike, the group continues. 
The good of the many supersedes the good of the few. The 
individual may be sacrificed for the good of all. The 
missionary asks the witchdoctor, "Why do you sacrifice a 
young person every year to the (volcanic; harvest; weather) 
gods? You haven't had a (volcanic; harvest; weather) problem 
for hundreds of years!" The witchdoctor simply answers, 
"Well?!" If a social activity does not destroy the 
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collective before it brings about a new generation, it 
continues. If that activity can be thought to be the reason 
for the continuation of the society, it becomes mandatory. 
What, knowing the tendency of many humans to go their 
own way, causes humans in a nondifferentiated society to 
conform, more, to willingly agree to conform, to such 
stringent rules? Durkheim states that it would appear that 
such nondifferentiated societies are held together by strict 
rules (laws) that have attached to them very strict 
penalties. These laws are always highly respected, even 
revered, as having come from a god, as well as feared, 
because of the penalties attached to them. Where do the laws 
come from? The first law would seem to be the law that is 
common to both cellular and human social systems. This law, 
or phenomenon, would appear "naturally" by the fact that in 
most cases in the primal world those animals who had a 
propensity for grouping survived—and more important to our 
subject, survived as a group. 
Those who wandered off, and surely there were those who 
wandered, were never seen or heard from again. They were 
assumed to be dead. Having entered the world of the unseen, 
they were thought to be just like those who had died in the 
presence of the group. The conclusion is logical and 
obvious: those who stay with the group survive; those who do 
not are never heard from again. It is just as obvious to see 
that when one leaves, the collective is weakened. 
There is safety in the group, danger in being alone. 
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There is safety in conformity, danger in being different. 
The greatest punishment the group can impose is rejection 
from the group, to the dangers of being "out." The greatest 
crime one can commit is to be "different," not to be "part of 
the group." Those who are guilty are "cast out," outcasts 
from the safety of the group. 
Even in the days of Plato the greatest punishment was 
"ostracizing," expulsion from the honor of being "Athenian." 
Socrates' crime was being different and enticing others to do 
the same; his punishment was expulsion from Athens. He, like 
most Athenians, chose rather to die than not to be part of 
the group. In the end even Socrates was a conformist. What 
events occurred to the descendants of those who left the 
group and survived is the subject for another study. Our 
history is the history of those who stayed, the stories of 
societies. 
There is a need for definition. Humans are not all the 
same. To what degree must I conform and in what areas? 
Social rules are decided upon by consensus. There is a need 
to protect the group from violence. Taking another person's 
tools or weapons could bring dissension and internal lack of 
trust. Not practicing the group's religious rituals could 
again lead to dissolution of the group. It is not so far 
frorr. the obvious to the not so obvious details of rules 
against certain forms of posture, attitudes, clothing, places 
to be, and things to do. All of these rules are based on 
consensus. They are not "abhorred because they are against 
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the law, but against the law because they are abhorred." 
Collective representation comes before conscience collective. 
Conscience collective is a direct result of a collective 
representation of right-wrong, good-evil, and safety-danger. 
Conscience collective is the consensus of what should and 
should not be done, or even thought. The consensus is not 
always spontaneous, not always properly internalized, not 
always logical or rational; but consensus is demanded and 
always enforced. It is this phenomenon of agreed-upon rules 
of conduct that, according to Durkheim, holds together a 
nondifferentiated society. 
"Modern" Societies 
Time passes; the environment becomes less harsh; there 
is a surplus of natural resources; and the numbers of people 
in a group increase. There is time for leisure. It is not 
necessary for every male to go on the hunt. Every female is 
not needed to tend the crops. A person has time to develop 
specialized skills. Someone begins to study the design of 
tools and weapons, making new designs that are more 
efficient, bringing about even more surplus. Trade begins. 
"Bring me a newly killed deer, and I will trade you my new 
knife for it." Value begins to be applied to specialized 
skills. A person is honored not only for the ability to 
bring food to the group but also for his/her ability to make 
life easier or more interesting. Rather than every person 
being something of a "jack-of-all-trades, " each person begins 
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to feel encouraged to express his/her special abilities. 
Once this has happened to a society, this "division of 
labor," it remains. Even if times get hard again, the group 
has learned the increased value to the group of specializa-
tion over generalization. 
As time passed for the early life forms, a similar event 
occurred. A mutation occurs in the DNA of a cell when it 
divides that makes it more efficient at processing food. It 
is so efficient that it is surrounded by surplus food. 
Another cell comes along eating food and, in the process, 
gulps down the new, more highly efficient cell. The cell 
membrane of the enveloped cell protects it from being 
digested. It continues to do what it does best—process 
food, which feeds its host and gives them both an advantage 
in the microscopic world of cell life. When its host 
divides, it divides. Given enough time, and time is 
plentiful, this cooperative situation becomes necessary to 
both cells' survival. Neither could live without the other. 
The process of differentiation was to continue and become 
more complex until multicellular, organic life finally 
appeared. For the cells this process of differentiation 
brought about a need for new methods of defense. Specific 
cells, cells very much like their ancestral beginnings, were 
called upon to distinguish between "self" and "other," others 
to destroy "other." For human societies, just as in 
biological organisms, differentiation leads to 
interdependence. 
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One individual learns how to make improved bows and 
arrows. His bows and arrows become so good, in fact, that 
the hunters would rather use his bows and arrows than their 
own. They are willing to give him some of the game if he 
will stay home and just make bows and arrows. Before, in the 
nondifferentiated society, all men would have gone on the 
hunt, and the game would have been shared with all. Now, 
since some are encouraged to stay home from the hunt, there 
is a value placed on their skills. One arrow is worth two 
squirrels, one bow worth one deer and so on. A free market 
has been created in which value is placed on differentiation 
rather than conformity. With time, the ability to make good 
bows and arrows is lost to the majority, known only by the 
children and grandchildren of the bow maker. Without the 
bowmaker the tribe would perish. He is protected in order to 
ensure the continuation of the collective. This phenomenon 
Durkheim called "the division of labor in society." 
Durkheim's observation was that as a society becomes 
more differentiated, the reliance on conformity decreases. 
The solidarity involved in a differentiated society Durkheim 
called "organic," referring to the same phenomenon in 
biological life where each organ of the body contributes to 
the well-being of the whole and none could survive alone. It 
was this interdependence upon the skills of each that 
Durkheim predicted would hold "modern" society together. 
Rather than conscience collective disappearing, however, 
being replaced by interdependence, conscience collective is 
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still with us. It has lost its former air of consensus. 
Where at one time rules were created because everyone in the 
collective agreed what acts were unacceptable, now there is a 
specialized entity—a minority, who decide for the majority 
what acts are unacceptable. A few now decide right and 
wrong, good and evil; but the few control the means of 
socialization, and the majority are persuaded to believe. 
The conscience collective is now no longer a spontaneous 
phenomenon of agreement but a phenomenon of a society under 
the control of its institutions and those that control them. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE COLLECTIVE-CONSCIENCE IN 
DURKHEIM'S OTHER MAJOR WORKS 
It was Durkheim's desire for sociology to become a 
field of study separate from history, psychology, and 
economics. In order to accomplish this task, it was 
neccessary to ask questions different from questions already 
asked about societal phenomena. 
Among those very necessary questions are: "What is it 
that sociologists are to study?" "How do you study that 
which is to be studied?" and "How do you present the results 
of your studies?" Durkheim dealt with these matters and more 
in The Rules of Sociological Method ([1895] 1982). My goal 
in this chapter is to determine if the conscience-collective 
is, according to Durkheim, a valid sociological phenomenon to 
be studied. 
Social Facts 
In order to be a scientific field, according to 
Durkheim, it is necessary for sociology to have "things" that 
can be observed. These "things" Durkheim chose to call 
"social facts" (Durkheim [1895] 1982, pp. 50-59). In order 
to qualify as a social fact, a phenomenon must be external to 
the individual. 
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Even when they conform to my own 
sentiments and when I feel their reality 
within me, that reality does not cease to 
be objective, for it is not I who have 
prescribed these duties; I have received 
them through education. (Durkheim [1895] 
1982, p. 50) 
These social facts are duties that are mandatory, even 
if I think they are things I desire to do. I want to be a 
good father,...but why? It is because I have been taught 
that it is a good thing to be a good father. Social social 
facts are, then, coercively imposed upon the individual. 
"Not only are these types of behaviour and thinking external 
to the individual, but they are imbued with a compelling and 
coercive power..." (Durkheim [1895] 1982, p. 51). 
Social facts are moral in nature. They are ways of 
acting and of being and how individuals feel about acting 
and existing in certain ways. This moral nature is shown by 
the use of the words "good," "bad," "right," and "wrong." 
Here, then, is a category of facts which 
present very special characteristics: 
they consist of manners of acting, 
thinking, and feeling external to the 
individual, which are invested with a 
coercive power by virtue of which they 
exercise control over him. Consequently, 
since they consist of representations and 
actions, they cannot be confused with 
organic phenomena, nor with psychic 
phenomena, which have no existence save 
in and through the individual 
consciousness. (Durkheim [1895] 1982, 
p. 52) 
Durkheim so strongly believed in the power of the social 
fact that he called what we think of as individual conscience 
an illusion. "Hence we are victims of an illusion which 
leads us to believe we have ourselves produced what has been 
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imposed upon us externally" (Durkheim [1895] 1982, p. 53). 
Just as Schopenhauer viewed the external material world as 
imposing its form on our minds, Durkheim viewed social facts 
as imposing their forms and shapes upon our minds, so much so 
that we think of our views of the external world as our own. 
Right and wrong, our very ethic that we like to think of as 
created within and by ourselves is really a creation of the 
sum of the experiences we have had in society. 
But, individual consciences are separate and different 
from the conscience-collective and are left for the 
psychologist to study. The sociologist is to study social 
facts. And, "...social facts are the beliefs, tendencies, 
and practice of the group taken collectively" (Durkheim 
[1895] 1982, p. 54). Social facts are to be viewed as 
having an independent life of their own, the ability to 
reproduce without the aid of individuals, "...a reality sui 
generis" (Durkheim [1895] 1982, p. 54). 
Durkheim1s definition of what sociologists are to study, 
with exceptions, is social facts, defined as 
A social fact is any way of acting 
whether fixed or not, capable of exerting 
over the individual an external 
constraint. (Durkheim [1895] 1982, p. 59) 
or 
...which is general over the whole of a 
given society whilst having an existence 
of its own independent of its individual 
manifestations. (Durkheim [1895] 1982, 
P. 59) 
Does the conscience-collective qualify as a social fact? 
By definition the conscience-collective is collective, 
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therefore social and not individual. It is external to the 
individual and separate from individual manifestations. In 
order to be a conscience-collective it would have to be 
universal to a given society. Does the conscience-co1lective 
exert power over the individual? By experience we can see 
that this is the case. 
Individuals or groups who observe holy days or 
holidays different from the majority and those who choose to 
eat differently, speak differently, or want to be left alone 
are placed under the pressure of the group, often through 
violence, to conform to the norm. Certainly the collective 
ideas of right or wrong and proper or improper are coercively 
imposed. 
The conscience-collective is a contemporary, vital force 
in all societies and is valid for study by sociologists. It 
can even be said it is the primary, universal force behind 
all social facts, the capo de capo of social facts. 
Suicide 
Of all the activities of mankind, one might consider the 
act of suicide to be the most personal, the least social in 
nature. In the study Suicide: A Study in Sociology ([1897] 
1951) Durkheim examined this phenomenon statistically. By 
using statistics from the total populations of Western 
European countries, Durkheim eliminated individual phenomena 
such as "psychopathic states" (pp. 57-81), "race, and 
heredity" (pp. 82-103), "the weather, or seasons" (pp. 
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104-122), and "imitation" (pp. 123-144) as causative for 
suicide. While not totally eliminating individual motivation 
as a reason for any singular suicidal event, he did 
effectively show that, even in such individualistic cases, 
the particular psychological state is generally a reflection 
of the condition of the collective of which the individual 
was a member. 
Social Types/Causes of Suicide 
Durkheim proposes that there are three social states 
that statistically seem to generate increases in the rate of 
suicide in a given society: 1) times of high individuality 
(egoism) in a society, 2) times of strong collectivity in a 
society (altruism), and 3) times of social confusion and lack 
of clarity in a society (anomie). 
In describing these types of social causes for suicide, 
Durkheim is also describing three basic types of collectives 
or societies. Durkheim observes that altruistic suicide is 
prevalent among "primitive societies" (Durkheim [1897] 1951, 
p. 219), by which he means "nondifferentiated." I propose 
that we take the logical step of observing that any society 
that is nondifferentiated, that is, in which there is little 
to no specialization, may be termed to be an altruistic 
society. 
When humans in primitive conditions begin to associate 
in groups, it is most likely to be for purposes of defense 
and cooperation in distribution of natural resources (one 
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storehouse for twenty people is easier to maintain and defend 
than twenty storehouses for twenty people). In the wild a 
loner has to be tough or fast to survive long enough to 
generate and raise the next generation. The need for 
specific functional strengths explains why there are so few 
genetic loners in the human species. 
Under these conditions the survival of the group is 
paramount. The individual is deemed to amount to little; 
only his contribution to the existence of the group is 
important. The governmental form in such a society would 
tend to be highly totalitarian in nature. Ritual and 
correctness of action and attitude would be religious in 
nature. Every action of individual life would be strictly 
delineated by the rules of the collective. Society and the 
individual would be "one" in the sense that no deviation 
would be allowed. A concise way of expressing this would be 
to say that an altruistic society is one in which the 
individual conscience is totally dominated by the conscience-
collective . Suicide in such a society, like every other 
activity, would be a result of collective pressure or 
collective consent. 
In egoistic and altruistic societies, society's ability 
to influence the individual is observed. Egoistic societies 
have little influence on the individual. The individual is 
considered to be very much on his or her own. Altruistic 
societies have absolute power over individual conduct. In 
this type of society we are brought to see society's power to 
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control the individual by examining what happens when the 
controlling signal, the conscience-collective, is not clearly 
expressed. In this type of society the individual may seek 
direction: "What is right to do?" or "What is wrong?" But, 
those signals are not clear, or in some cases, perhaps, the 
individual is rejected by the collective, saying "It doesn't 
matter that you want to conform; we don't want you." In 
either case the individual is caused to feel disconnected 
from society. 
An anomic society is a society in transition. Such a 
society does not send clear signals to its members as to what 
is moral or immoral. Individuals in such a society are "on 
their own," left to their own devises. This isolation brings 
about insecurity, a sense of imminent danger that drives some 
to escape, even the escape of suicide. 
Altruistic Suicide 
If, as we have just seen, excessive 
individuation leads to suicide, 
insufficient individuation has the same 
effects. When man has become detached 
from society, he encounters less 
resistance to suicide in himself, and he 
does so likewise when social integration 
is too strong. (Durkheim [1897] 1951, 
p. 217) 
Durkheim examined several primitive societies to 
determine what may have been a commonality in motivation for 
suicide. Historically there are cases of soldiers being 
socially constrained to commit suicide upon the death of the 
king or general. There are cases of wives being constrained 
to kill themselves. We can all remember the cases of the 
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servants of the Egyptian Pharaohs, who were buried with their 
former sovereigns. 
Durkheim called this form of suicide "altruistic" suicide. 
He discusses three sub-types of altruistic suicide: 
1) obligatory altruistic suicide, 2) optional altruistic 
suicide, and 3) acute, or typically, mystical suicide. 
Obligatory Suicide 
Durkheim discusses three situations of obligatory 
altruistic suicide: 1) suicides of men on the threshold of 
old age or stricken with sickness, 2) suicides of women on 
their husbands death, and 3) suicides of followers or 
servants on the death of their chiefs. 
Now when a person kills himself, in all 
these cases, it is not because he assumes 
the right to do so but, on the contrary, 
because it is his duty. If he fails in 
this obligation, he is dishonored, and 
also punished, usually by religious 
sanctions. (Durkheim [1897] 1951, 
P. 219) 
Optional Suicide 
There are cases in which a society does not command 
suicide nor condemn it, but in certain cases it is allowed, 
and even a degree of status applied to the act. An example 
is the Japanese ritual of hara-kiri, which is very nearly, 
but not in all cases, obligatory. In many cases it is 
prestigious for one who has lost face to commit suicide 
ritually. Because the person has a choice in the matter, 
Durkheim calls this "optional altruistic suicide." 
Acute Altruistic Suicide 
In acute altruistic suicide, the person commits suicide 
not because of a felt obligation to do so, but in order to 
experience the "joy of sacrifice" (Durkheim [1897] 1951, 
p. 223). Durkheim gives examples of Hindu, Jainist, and 
early Christian martyrs as examples. In this case the 
person, through the teachings he has received, sees death as 
a release, a passing to a better existence. The 
conscience-collective of the social group to which he belong 
not only allows for the act of suicide but even offers 
rewards for the act. The conscience-collective is so strong 
that the individual senses that "he has no personal 
existence" (Durkheim [1897] 1951, p. 226). 
"The person kills himself at the command of his 
conscience; he submits to an imperative" (Durkheim [1897] 
1951, p. 283). We have already seen that the individual 
conscience is only a reflection of the collective conscience 
Altruistic suicides amount to self-sacrifices to the state, 
commanded by the conscience-collective. Durkheim attributes 
altruistic suicide to "lower societies" (Durkheim [1897] 
1951, p. 227). By lower societies he is referring to 
societies in which there is little differentiation. The 
majority of the members of these societies perform the same 
societal functions. Each individual is unnecessary to the 
whole. If one dies, another just like himself/herself is 
there to fill the gap. Because there is little 
specialization, each is like the other. For all practical 
purposes the collective mind, thought, conscience is the 
individual's (Durkheim [1897] 1951, p. 221). An Altruistic 
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society, then, is one in which the conscience-collective is 
all-powerful. The individual conscience is only a reflection 
of the collective. 
Egoistic Suicide 
"Egoistic suicide results from the fact that society is 
not sufficiently integrated at all points to keep all its 
members under its control" (Durkheim, [1897] 1951, p. 373). 
There are periods in history in which the state, government, 
or society is not looked upon with favor by the majority of 
its citizens. The rules of society are not well observed. 
Children are taught that the individual is more important 
than the state. The majority of members of such a society 
manage to find cohesiveness in church or social 
organizations. "However individualized a man may be, there 
is always something collective remaining..." (Durkheim [1987] 
1951, p. 214). 
It might appear that the person who finds in religion 
solace from a weak society is less susceptible to suicide 
because of the teachings of the church against it. However 
Durkheim proposes a different reason: 
If religion protects man against the 
desire for self-destruction, it is not 
that it preaches the respect for his own 
person to him with arguments sui generis; 
but because it is a society. What 
constitutes this society is the existence 
of a certain number of beliefs and 
practices common to all the faithful, 
traditional and thus obligatory. The 
more numerous and strong these collective 
states of mind are, the stronger the 
integration of the religious community, 
and also the greater its preservative 
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value. The details of dogmas and rites 
are secondary. The essential thing is 
that they be capable of supporting a 
sufficiently intense collective life. 
(Durkheim [1897] 1951, p. 170) 
Durkheim describes the protection a strongly knit 
society provides against suicide as the result of an 
interaction between individual and collective beliefs 
(consciences). 
Where collective sentiments are strong, 
it is because the force with which they 
affect each individual conscience is 
echoed in all the others, and 
reciprocally. (Durkheim [1987] 1951, 
p. 201) 
When the conscience-collective and the individual 
conscience are in agreement, the result is a stable society 
in which the members are content and free of insecurity. 
This is a state which Plato, in The Republic, defined as 
justice. When the individual feels agreement and security 
in society, individualization is unnecessary, the person is 
absorbed into the collective, personal tragedies are not 
essential tragedies, and the collective is seen as a haven in 
which to hide from life's slings and arrows of misfortune. 
When not in agreement, the individual feels a sense that 
his fate is his own, security is hard to come by. In a 
society where the individual is considered to be of prime 
importance, the person has only himself to turn to. As 
Durkheim said "...there is always something collective 
remaining..." (Durkheim [1897] 1951, p. 214). It would seem 
that a need for acceptance by the collective, as well as the 
protection of the collective, is an essential characteristic 
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of Homo Sapiens Sapiens. When help outside one's self is 
needed, and one believes only in one's self, the sense of 
hopelessness becomes unbearable; and with no collective moral 
restriction on the taking of one's life, the person escapes 
by the only means available (Durkheim [1897] 1951, p. 288). 
We might say, then, that when social solidarity is strong, 
the conscience-collective is strong. When the conscience-
collective is strong, individual conscience tends to be 
patterned after it. When individual conscience agrees that 
the collective it greater than the individual, egoism is 
lessened, along with a lessening of egoistic suicide. 
Most of our early ancestors who survived the early days 
of danger from outside the group, survived because they had a 
sense of security in numbers. The herding instinct served to 
protect the majority of humans. If a hundred animals form a 
circled mass, only those on the outside edge of the circle 
are in danger. These individuals would tend to be the most 
adventurous, the bravest, and the most individualistic. In 
times of danger these would be the chosen ones, the leaders 
in war, the protectors. Individualism, in a person who is 
genetically predisposed to egoism, is an acceptable, even 
desired situation. But, to a person who is of the majority, 
living in a society that stresses individualism is 
unacceptable. A groupie cannot exist as a loner. A bovine 
does not make a good wolf. Persons not predisposed to self-
sufficiency do not find satisfaction in a society that is 
built on individualism. As a result, such people decide that 
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since their lives are their own, they are free to destroy 
their lives. In terms of conscience, a sense of right and 
wrong, the individual conscience is considered to be superior 
to the collective conscience; and the individual, having no 
personal qualms concerning suicide, performs it without 
offering excuse or seeking acceptance of the act. 
...collective force is one of the 
obstacles best calculated to restrain 
suicide.... But how could society impose 
its supremacy upon them--people—when 
they refuse to accept this subordination 
as legitimate? ...So far as they are the 
admitted masters of their destinies, it 
is their privilege to end their lives." 
(Durkheim [1897] 1951, p. 209) 
When the collective sentiment is strong, so is the 
conscience-collective. When collective sentiment is weak, 
the collective conscience is also weak. The individual 
conscience rules. If the individual's morals find suicide an 
acceptable means of dealing with life's problems, there is 
little to restrain him/her. 
An anomic society would be one in which the society is 
undergoing change. Transition from one collective-
conscience to another, such as we have been experiencing in 
the United States, is a good example. While the basic 
premise of the founders of our country was individualistic, 
they were being highly idealistic and naive to believe that a 
society would remain so. What we have experienced over the 
last two hundred years is a continual state of transition. 
The "melting pot" idea of the nature of our populous is an 
interesting concept. "Stirring pot" would be more accurate. 
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The varieties of social backgrounds of those people who make 
up our country and the fact that the influx of new people is 
on a continual basis has meant that we are constantly 
redefining what it means to be "American." 
It becomes very hard for the average person to decide, 
then, what is right and what is wrong. The conscience-
collective is not weak, but it is sending mixed and 
constantly changing signals and definitions of right and 
wrong. Should prostitution be legal or illegal? Should 
all drugs be considered illegal, or should we legalize the 
use of some but not others, or should all drugs be legalized? 
How should the two sexes communicate with each other? What 
is a man? What is a woman? What is expected of me? These 
are questions that would not, could not, be asked in an 
altruistic society. 
In an altruistic society the definitions are clear, the 
conscience-collective is well defined, and the collective 
control over the individual is absolute. In an anomie 
society there is constant wonder on the part of the 
individual as to his/her place in the society and what is 
proper conduct. In an anomie society, there should be 
frequent "explosions" of nonconformity. Times of 
equilibrium and altruism would be punctuated by periods of 
unrest, nonconformity, even violence, and certainly anomie. 
This nonconformity is, of course, what we see in the 
course of the history of our country, even of our world. The 
evolution of human society is not a gradualistic, 
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analog-change evolution, but a state of punctuated-
equilibrium evolution. Societies tend to have long periods 
of altruistic peace through control. Between these periods 
the spirit of individualism begins to move over the waters of 
society. Unrest begins. Demand for change, for a new level 
of human freedom, begins to spread. The general public 
becomes aware of the problems of the protesters and joins the 
call to the "definers of the conscience-collective" to make 
changes to accommodate the deviant behavior. Many even begin 
to incorporate attributes of the deviant group into their own 
ways of life. The rightness of allowing people to do their 
own thing is internalized and reified by the majority of the 
totality. 
Finally enough pressure is brought to bear upon the 
leadership that the structure itself is changed to allow for 
parts of the deviant behavior to become first "acceptable" 
then actually incorporated into the official conscience-
collective itself. It is interesting to note that no 
official changes in rules of conduct are made until the 
actual conscience-collective, that of the majority of people, 
has already changed. 
During these periods of anomie there should also be an 
increase in the use of mood-altering, mind- altering drugs, 
as well as an increase in material- world-escaping religious 
experience, which, of course, we find to be true. 
If, then, societies evolve and human society as a 
totality evolves by punctuated equilibrium, the question 
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arises, "Evolves from what to what?" Is there a direction to 
the change of human society? If so, what is that direction? 
"Primitive" societies, societies of little 
individualism, little specialization of skills, therefore, 
little division of labor, are so out of necessity for 
survival. As society conquers the environment, the dangers 
of the exterior (to the society) world lessens. The need for 
solidarity is not so greatly felt. Opportunity for self-
expression arises. All humans feel this need to "be one's 
self." As the need for conformity decreases, this need for 
individualism increases. But the conscience-collective 
changes only slowly. The old ways have "always worked." 
Change brings insecurity, danger, to those who were raised 
from childhood believing in the "old ways." It is the young 
who are not afraid of change. It takes time for the old 
generation to accept change or to die out until they are no 
longer in the majority. By the time the young are in 
control, they are no longer the young. It is their ways that 
bring the security of time and usefulness, and their ways are 
no longer so different from the old ways. But they are 
different. Each new generation brings with it a renewed call 
for individual rights, for a redefinition of the 
conscience-collective. Each new generation takes another 
step, most often a small one, toward that Edenic society of 
individual liberty. 
So, the apparent goal of this punctuated-equilibrium 
evolution of human society is a society in which the 
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individual is paramount, rather than the collective. In this 
society the division of labor would, as Durkheim proposed, be 
the ultimate means of solidarity. The specialty-skill of the 
person and its need by the society would be paramount to 
his/her success. The important point of this form of society 
would be the need, therefore the worth, of the individual. 
In this society the individual would be pampered, even 
coddled. To lose even one person to the collective, to lose 
the specialized skills the individual brings to the survival 
of all, would be considered devastating. In this society 
every form of conduct would be acceptable to the 
conscience-collective except conduct that would endanger the 
life or liberties of another individual, and through that, 
the life and liberty of the collective. 
This form of society, which history tells us is the 
ultimate goal of societal evolution, could be termed, in 
Durkheimian terms, an "egoist society." During anomic 
periods in societal evolution, the attention is brought to 
the individual. At the end of anomic periods compromises are 
made which allow renewed equilibrium. New rules are compiled 
to restrict the individual from deviating "too far" from the 
norm. Often the result is a backward step toward more 
control rather than less, if the controlling elite is very 
powerful. When intense egoism occurs, the end is ultimately, 
finally, collapse of the society. 
The "official" conscience, the conscience-collective 
and the individual conscience—three definitions of right 
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and wrong--are in a state of flux during the transition 
from unrest to equilibrium. The individual who has a great 
need for self sufficiency, the egoist, finds himself in a 
state of personal anomie. Thus, the incidence of egoistic 
suicide would increase during a period in society that might 
be called an "egoistic period." 
We have looked at three forms of society and the three 
forms of suicide common in each society: egoistic, altruistic 
and anomie. Each of these forms of society can be described 
by describing the relative functions of the conscience-
collective in it. In the egoist society the individual is 
all important. By the same token society is considered a 
protector of the rights and freedoms of the individual. Each 
person determines his/her own moral system. The individual 
conscience is very strong, the conscience-collective very 
weak. All social institutions of a society reflect the 
society itself. The institution of suicide dominant in an 
egoistic society, called egoistic suicide, is a result of the 
individual feeling such a distance from the collective that a 
sense of uselessness and purposelessness takes him over 
(Durkheim [1897] 1951, p. 225). Finding no reason for 
living, no goals beyond self, suicide is the result. 
In the altruistic society, which is normally a 
nondifferentiated society in which there is little division 
of labor, the situation is exactly the opposite. The sense 
of "being like all the others" is very strong. The 
individual is unimportant. The collective is all. The gods 
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work with the "people," the "nation," or the "family," but 
seldom with the individual unless it is to use him/her in 
some way to guide the collective. The dominant form of 
suicide in this society is one in which societal sanctions 
demand the act in certain cases. If you are about to become 
a burden to the collective, if you are about to become 
useless, or if the society is about to undergo a drastic 
change in which you will not fit--such as the death of your 
master or husband--the answer is to die. Often, to 
facilitate this, the promise of a happier existence in the 
after-life is made. If this promise is believed in strongly 
enough, there are some who will commit suicide, just to "get 
over." 
Religious Experience 
In You Shall Be As Gods Erich Fromm (1966, pp. 17-18) 
makes an important point concerning the religious experience 
of an individual. 
There is simultaneously permanence and 
change in any living being; hence, there 
is permanence and change in any concept 
reflecting the experience of a living 
man. However, that concepts have their 
own lives, and that they grow, can be 
understood only if the concepts are not 
separated from the experience to which 
they give expression. If the concept 
becomes alienated—that is, separated 
from the experience to which it 
refers—it loses its reality and is 
transformed into an artifact of man's 
mind. The fiction is thereby created 
that anyone who uses the concepts is 
referring to the substratum of experience 
underlying it. Once this happens—and 
this process of the alienation of 
concepts is the rule rather than the 
exception--the idea expressing an 
experience has been transformed into an 
ideology that usurps the place of the 
underlying reality within the living 
human being. History then becomes a 
history of ideologies rather than the 
history of concrete, real men who are the 
producers of their ideas. 
Fromm is here giving a perfect description of the 
operation of Schopenhauer's and Durkheim's representation and 
conscience-collective. For example, a man is lost in a 
woods. He has no food or water. He is afraid, tired, and 
hungry. Finally, he sits, leaning on an oak tree. In his 
condition he begins to cry out for help. A bright light 
becomes visible to him. He hears sounds like voices but 
cannot tell what is being said. A wind shakes the trees, 
making a loud, "whooshing" sound. Fruit and nuts fall at his 
feet. He eats. Being filled, he lies down and sleeps the 
drugged sleep of one who has been starved and exhausted and 
has now been filled with a high amount of simple 
carbohydrates (a sugar high). He dreams of an old man who 
speaks to him, telling him that he need never worry when lost 
in the woods if he finds a tree like this one with which to 
nourish himself. 
When he awakes, now rested and his hunger satiated, he 
easily finds his way home. When he arrives at his village, 
friends and neighbors who had worried about him now rejoice 
for him and are anxious to know how he survived all night in 
the storm. As he relates his story, the people make joyful 
noises for every event related. He gets caught up in the 
77 
telling of the story. People ask questions. He answers, the 
story getting more and more interesting with the telling. He 
fills in blanks. The dream becomes reality to him as well as 
to those listening. The old man becomes a powerful entity 
who has power to help those who believe in Him when lost. 
Soon the peripherals become more important than the actual 
events, and a new reality is born. 
The people ask to see the tree. He takes them to it; 
and while they are there, they ask him to tell the story 
again. He tells the story again, now highly elaborated upon. 
He begins to sense an uplifting rush of emotion during the 
exciting parts (which get more exciting each time), and the 
people feel it too. The wind blows as before, and the people 
believe that the old man is showing his presence in the wind. 
They all experience, together, a sense of well-being and 
emotional elation here at the tree. With time, our hero 
becomes a priest, the intermediary between the people and the 
old man. A god has been born. 
The next generation, not knowing the original story or 
the events leading up to the creation of the new religion, 
experience the religion as something that is eternal—that 
is, it existed before them and will exist after they are 
gone. It exists everywhere they go; it is external to 
themselves; it has absolute power over every aspect of their 
lives and those around them; it defines what is right and 
what is wrong and has continuity, or history. This 
religion has become, as Durkheim would say, a social fact. 
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What exists, from the moment of the first telling of the 
story, is not a reality, nor even a factual relating of the 
story, but a representation of the events of the story. 
Since each person cannot experience the same "reality" that 
the first man did, they share in the relating of the story 
and share the emotional thrill of the presence of the old 
man. The representation is the reality for the tribe; the 
actual event is lost forever. 
As story tellers are trained, there is a right way, 
and there are wrong ways of telling the story. There are 
proper ways of approaching the "holy tree." There are 
lessons to be learned from the story. Morals are defined by 
the tellers. Since all in the tribe are taught from birth 
those beliefs important to the religion, all have no choice 
but to think of the story as true. All agree. What is 
important is that while there may be sanctions against 
improper conduct as defined by the tellers, for the most 
part these sanctions are unnecessary. The majority just 
accepts "truth" as truth. This is the conscience-collective 
in action in the formation and maintenance of religious 
dogma. 
An experience that is not shared is an experience soon 
forgotten. We all want to share experiences we have had, 
whether they be good ones or bad. In the attempt to explain 
or understand events that happen to us, we attribute powers 
above us as causes for events. A sense of understanding 
comes over us as we attribute events to the "gods." As we 
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begin to understand that some power above us can control us, 
we of course seek to placate or please that power. We begin 
to sense that we all can share in the comfort and security of 
believing. Soon a group is formed, a group of believers. As 
the assembly begins to form, as always, rules of conduct are 
created. When one is performing placations for the power, 
there must be order, a way to act and a way not to act. 
Rituals are created. Soon there is a consensus of opinion on 
proper and improper conduct—morals. A sense of right and 
wrong, the conscience-collective has taken root. 
Thus we arrive at the following definition: 
A religion is a unified system of beliefs 
and practices relative to sacred things, 
that is to say, things set apart and 
forbidden—beliefs and practices which 
unite into a single moral community, 
called a "church," all those who adhere 
to them. (Durkheim [1912] 1960, p. 65) 
It is, thus, very probable—this brief 
exposition, of course, is not rigorous 
proof—that religion corresponds to an 
equally very central area of the 
conscience collective. (Durkheim [1893] 
1960, p. 143) 
Religion in modern society remains a focal point for 
determinations of right and wrong. The collective conscience 
is still first shaped and formed by religion. It is wrong to 
abort unborn children but right to kill those convicted of 
certain crimes. It is wrong to smoke marijuana but 
acceptable to smoke tobacco. It is wrong to use heroin but 
acceptable to drink alcohol. There is no consistency to the 
conscience-collective; there is only what is traditionally 
socially acceptable and what is not. The church is not the 
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keeper of the secrets of the gods or the safety of the 
faithful, but the guardian of the conscience-collective. 
Equivalence of Immune System and Conscience-Collective 
The immune system of mammals provides an interesting 
parallel with the activity of the conscience-collective. A 
good example of social preservation is given by the actions 
of amoebae: 
"Self" has two senses when applied to a 
single-cell organism, for example the 
amoebae, which usually reproduces 
asexually by dividing. One sense of 
"self" is genetic. A colony of amoebae 
that has arisen as clones--with all its 
cells descended through cell division 
from a single ancestor—is a single 
"self," since all members of the clone 
are genetically identical. They have all 
descended from their ancestor without any 
changes in the genetic material, such 
changes generally being wrought through 
sexual reproduction. Death of one or 
more of the cells in the clone does not 
mean an end to a particular set of genes. 
"Self" in this sense still requires that 
each cell have some protection against 
invasion by "foreign," since without such 
protection the entire colony is likely to 
be destroyed once one of its members is 
invaded by another organism. For 
example, a bacterium can invade one 
member, then reproduce itself and go on 
to invade other members of the clone. 
A second sense of "self" might be termed 
geometric or physical. This is the sense 
in which the single amoeba functions. 
"Self" begins at its surface, and 
anything outside of that surface is 
"foreign." For the amoeba in the first 
instance, "foreign" is food; so, food-
processing and destruction of harmful 
foreign molecules and cells are the same. 
The ways in which amoebae seek, capture, 
and digest "foreign" are not unique to 
them and their kin. They are also used 
by amoeba-like cells that destroy invad-
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ing bacteria and damaged cells in multi-
cellular animals. (Adler 1961, p. 4) 
Amoebae experience "collective self" in a way not unlike 
human society. In a very real sense, all amoebae in a given 
"clan" are extensions of the original "self." There are a 
number of possible genetic variabilities caused by a variety 
of genetic processes; but, for the most part, it can be said 
of a given "clan" of amoebae that they are genetically the 
same. If some variability enters in that proves to be fatal 
or if there is an attack from some exterior agency and one, 
a few, or many amoebae die as a result, there is still no 
fatal blow to the social "self," as long as some, who resist 
the attack, survive to reproduce and continue the "clan." 
In the case of more complex animals and plants, 
specialized organs and systems exist which defend the 
organism from general damage while sacrificing a few 
individual cells for the sake of the whole. In both cases, 
the simple cell and the organism, there is a complex 
methodology to determine sameness or differentness. If an 
intruder is determined to be "different," it is destroyed; 
no deviance allowed. 
How similar this is to the process of sociation. The 
collective, according to Durkheim, forms a "collective 
representation" of reality, of "sameness," conformity. 
(Durkheim [1898] 1974). There develops a conscience-
collective which serves as a "litmus test" of correct 
individual opinion to determine the level of conformity. If 
the individual agrees with the conscience-collective, then 
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no special defensive activity takes place. If the individual 
is found wanting in conformity, then all the defenses 
available begin to activate. 
If purely moral rules are at stake, the 
public conscience restricts any act which 
infringes them by the surveillance it 
exercises over the conduct of citizens 
and by the special punishments it has at 
its disposal (Durkheim [1895] 1982, p. 51). 
What is available to the collective as a means of 
enforcing conformity on the part of individuals? In the case 
of amoebae, the "sport" is eaten. In human society deviant 
individuals are not killed and eaten, at least not 
physically, not in "modern civilization." What of societies' 
tools for enforcement? In the case of "primitive" mechanical 
societies, rules are enforced strictly. Those who threaten 
the tranquility of the collective are tried and punished. 
(Durkheim [1893] 1984, p. 31). 
In the case of "modern" organic solidarity, where the 
individual is valuable because of some difference in skill or 
ability and where these differences are the prime factor in 
solidarity, punishment for deviance is usually a penalty of 
restitution or fine; but basically the individual is forced 
to conform, rather than be cast out (Durkheim [1893] 1984, 
p. 68). It would seem that, since individuality in several 
areas is valued for its contribution to the solidarity of the 
whole, minor infractions are not abhorred as they are in 
mechanical solidarity. 
Durkheim may have expected that modern society would 
finally shake itself loose from the mechanical forms of 
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solidarity. If so, at least to the present, though many have 
tried for a process of resocialization rather than 
punishment, he was, apparently, wrong. We yet have the 
concept of punishment in effect in our societies. The primal 
human within the collective still cries for an "eye for an 
eye" rather than redemption. 
This is not to say that there is no individuality, 
either in amoebae or in human society. As long as the 
individuality is not threatening to the solidarity of the 
collective, it is tolerated or permitted. "Moreover, we know 
that all social constraints do not necessarily exclude the 
individual personality" (Durkheim [1895] 1982, p. 52). 
Durkheim may have gone so far in the direction of 
"clonism" concerning the social individual that, like the 
symbolic interactionists of later social theory, he may have 
seen the individual self as a social creation, socially 
maintained. 
Durkheim regarded individualism as a 
collective representation, a force that 
would impress itself on human minds 
regardless of their subjective opinions, 
and the manifestation of the egotistical 
will. (Mestrovic 1988, p. 8) 
Like the individual amoeba, the individual human finds 
himself a "one of many," not quite identical to the others 
but enough in sameness as to not be a cause for sanctions. 
The majority of us learn very early to conform, to not rock 
the boat or risk punishment. Like the amoeba, as an 
individual, he/she is expendable. Die or leave the 
collective, and the collective goes on as if nothing had 
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happened. Fail to conform, and the conscience-collective is 
activated, bringing into play the forces of the social 
institutions, the "immune system" of the collective. 
Societies form from people who are in close proximity to 
each other. As the numbers of individuals in the group 
grow, positions and officers are created, and a division of 
labor occurs; people become specialists. Finally, a given 
group increases in size until, like Abraham and Lot, the 
group, or collective, is too large to interact efficiently, 
and a division occurs. 
As long as people are in physical contact with each 
other, the common conscience, the agreed upon sense of what 
is right and wrong, is safe, common to all. "...no social 
fact can exist except where there is a well defined social 
organisation" (Durkheim [1895] 1982, p. 52). When people 
separate, the environment is different for some from what it 
is for others. In order to maintain continuity, occasional 
reunions are organized. Persons at fairs, carnivals, 
picnics, and places where people can touch again, share 
experiences, and reaffirm common acceptance of mores and 
customs. At such events the conscience-collective is 
reshaped and shared. 
Nothing is more certain than growth and change. The 
number of human beings has increased until it is impossible 
for all to communicate to the general collective. We appoint 
representitives to meet with other representitives. They 
will communicate, share their common experiences, and pass 
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back to us the results of their meeting. But these groups 
become too large for effective communication, and new 
collectives are formed from newly appointed representatives. 
Finally, the distance from the UN to one's neighborhood is 
too great; there occurs a breakdown in communications. 
Collectives create their own conscience, different from one 
another. Things that would offend the collective conscience 
in the neighborhood are performed daily in the state capitol. 
The Federal government prosecutes state-elected officers for 
actions that are daily activities of Federal officials. 
The collective-conscience of those "on the hill" is 
different from that in Metcalfe County. They are two 
different societies. Someone "on the hill" who is from 
Metcalfe county will act differently at home than he will in 
Washington. Things done daily on the job are kept secret 
from the home. The appearannce of consensus must be kept up, 
even if it doesn't exist. There exists a multitude of widely 
differing societies, ruled over by a series of smaller and 
more powerful elitist societies. For each separate society 
there exists a separate conscience-collective. Only when 
there is direct interaction between these societies does any 
commonality appear. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have discussed Durkheim's concept of 
collective phenonena, especially the conscience-collective. 
I have compared Durkheim's collective phenomena with 
Schopenhauer's individual phenomena. Durkheim's probable 
dependence upon Schopenhauer's basic premise was explored. 
Examples of the conscience-collective in action have been 
given, along with brief summaries of Durkheim's major works 
and their dependence upon the concept of the conscience-
collective . The previous chapter ends with a comparison of 
collective action in human society and the collective conduct 
of amoebae, microscopic animals which few people would care 
to be compared with, and yet.... 
Sociology, Quo Vadis? 
Important studies are being conducted today. It 
would seem that not only social realities are socially 
created, but also that much of the process by which 
Schopenhauer's "world as will" imposes itself upon the 
individual will is very much a social process as well. A 
simple example of this is how our view of the atom has 
changed during this century. At first, only a few esoteric 
scientists will be aware of a new "model" of reality, but 
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eventually we all come to accept new paradigms of knowledge. 
Our old "realities" are quite comfortable until we find that 
a majority of our friends are beginning to see the new 
reality. Only then does our view of the universe change. It 
is habitual, even necessary, for academicians to refer to 
"higher" authority in their work. This rule is socially 
imposed, having no "reality" of its own in the philosophic 
sense. This rule alone has caused knowledge to stagnate in 
the cesspool of repetitive intercessory ritual. Let us take 
a lesson from Schopenhauer and Durkheim and view these 
representations as just that and not as the reality, or 
"thing in itself." To whose maps do the pioneers refer? 
Those of us who desire to delve into the unknown, by 
definition, will find no one to whom we can refer. 
We who desire the light of understanding, who desire to 
have proper representation of the universe's presentation, 
find ourselves much in the position of the individual who was 
delivered from Plato's cave. We know what has gone before is 
not quite correct, yet we cannot find the proper means to 
communicate with our former fellow inmates the beauty of the 
light outside the cave. 
In the light of Durkheim's familiarity with 
Schopenhauer's philosophy of the world as "will and idea," 
what can be said of the meaning of conscience-collective in 
today's sociology? Indeed, what can be said of the goals and 
future of sociology from today onward? It is apparent that 
Durkheim viewed social facts, social "reality" in the same 
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manner as Schopenhauer's Vorstellung, or representations. 
In The Rules of Sociological Method, Durkheim ([1895] 1982) 
advised us to study social facts and limit ourselves to 
studying that area of reality that lies between ourselves as 
we interact in daily social life. We are to study, then, the 
act of the creation of "collective representations." 
In Durkheim's time, there was no strict delineation 
between the social sciences. History, psychology, economics, 
and sociology each melded one into the other in terms of 
expertise. It was up to him to define that specific area of 
study for the sociologist as the representation that seems to 
be created in the process of human interaction. Durkheim 
warned us about the danger of accumulation of facts without 
interpretation. In this time of division in sociology, 
perhaps we should return to our roots. The study of Durkheim 
would bring us to understand that social realities are, in 
themselves, representations, "collective consciences" which 
are, while being very powerful over the individual 
representations, yet malleable and changeable. Following 
Durkheim we can come to realize that discrimination, poverty, 
crime, drug abuse, and violence are caused by and, indeed, 
are, themselves, representations. If we are to conquer these 
social ills, we must fight them at the level of 
representation, individual representation, through the 
process of socialization (Durkheim [1895] 1982, p. 66). 
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